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A RETREAT FROM JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT AND THE ENVIRONMENT
ROBERT

L. GLICKSMAN*

The spate of federal environmental legislation enacted in the late
1960's and early 1970's provided a fertile breeding ground for litigation.
The federal courts reacted to the resulting proliferation of lawsuits by
aggressively promoting the new, pro-environmental legislative objectives.
They lowered the barriers to private litigants' access to the federal courts,
subjected administrative agencies to procedural requirements not always
apparent on the face of applicable legislation, interpreted environmental
laws expansively and used common law to fill statutory gaps, and engaged in rigorous review of the substantive merit of agency decisions
which seemed to give insufficient weight to legislatively sanctioned environmental values.
By the 1980's, the courts, led by the Supreme Court, were presenting a much lower profile in environmental cases, even though Congress
remained firmly committed to the environmental protection initiatives
commenced earlier. Judicial expansions of the role of private parties in
implementing environmental legislation, broad statutory interpretations,
and reversals of agency action for failure to adequately protect the environment were less common. This retreat from judicial promotion of proenvironmental objectives is illustrated by four decisions of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit between 1980 and 1986. All four decisions involved the protracted (and thus far unsuccessful) attempts by the
State of Illinois and the federal Environmental Protection Agency to
clean up pollution in Waukegan Harbor and Lake Michigan allegedly
caused by a manufacturer of outboard motors and industrial and turf
care vehicles. I
This article investigates the reasons for the recent retreat from ag* Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1973, Union College; M.A. 1974, Harvard
University; J.D. 1977, Cornell University. The author thanks his colleagues Sidney Shapiro, Richard Levy, and Elinor Schroeder for their comments and suggestions during the formulation of this
article. The author also thanks Nancy Wilson, third year law student, for her invaluable research
assistance.
I. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
457 (1986); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. (1986); Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1982); Illinois
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U.S. 917
(1981).
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gressive judicial implementation of environmental legislation, both generally and in the Seventh Circuit. The courts' increased reluctance to
actively promote environmental protection objectives may be partially attributable to individual judges' beliefs that environmental regulation of
business has become excessive, or that the costs of such regulation have
become disproportionate to the benefits it produces. To the extent the
recent reduced judicial promotion of environmental objectives is attributable to these beliefs, the courts are engaging in a kind of activism which
may improperly elevate the judges' own policy preferences over legislative policy decisions.
The retreat from aggressive regulatory implementation by the federal courts, however, is not peculiar to environmental litigation and may
have nothing to do with the judges' personal views on the merits of environmental legislation. Rather, it appears to be part of a broader movement toward institutional judicial restraint. This movement has been
fueled by growing concerns about the limits of the courts' authority and
competence to review the implementation of regulatory legislation.
Whereas the federal courts in the 1960's and early 1970's stressed their
obligation to prevent executive branch subversion of the legislative will,
more recent decisions reflect the belief that an unrestrained judiciary actively seeking to implement its own notions of public policy infringes
improperly upon executive and legislative authority. Although doubts
about judicial competence to review the decisions of expert regulatory
agencies are not new, the burgeoning caseload of the federal courts seems
to have reinforced these doubts.
Ironically, the institutional judicial restraint prompted by these concerns, if taken to extremes, has the potential to raise separation of powers
problems similar to those that courts purporting to exercise institutional
restraint are seeking to avoid. A judiciary unwilling to review in any
meaningful way the faithfulness of agency decisions to statutory goals
invites executive branch subversion of the legislature's will. A judiciary
that refuses to carry out the responsibilities delegated to it in regulatory
legislation itself infringes upon congressional authority. The recent retreat from active judicial participation in the regulatory process thus has
the potential to invade the domain of the other two branches, whether
that retreat is grounded in individual judges' personal policy preferences
or in concerns about relative institutional competence.
Both the institutional activism characteristic of the 1960's and
1970's and the more recent institutional restraint are based upon legitimate separation of powers concerns. Both have the potential, however,
to exacerbate those concerns if taken to extremes, at which point both
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institutional postures begin to look suspiciously like a judicial activism
derived from the judges' own policy preferences. The task of the Seventh
Circuit, as well as of the other federal courts, should be to assist the
Supreme Court in striking the appropriate balance between the two extremes. If the courts succeed in defining that balance, they will have
charted a course which facilitates judicial reversal of agency decisions
inconsistent with statutory objectives without sanctioning judicial usurpation of the authority of the other two branches.
I.

ACTIVISM, RESTRAINT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION

A.

Two Kinds of JudicialActivism and Restraint

This article explores the reasons for and effects of judicial activism
and restraint in the context of federal court review of the implementation
of regulatory legislation. 2 It distinguishes between two different types of
activism and restraint. The first type deals with the extent to which a
judge is willing to substitute his or her own notions of optimal public
policy for those of the legislature that enacted or the agencies charged
with implementing a regulatory statute. A court that elevates its own
policy objectives above those of the other two branches of government is
'3
engaged in what may be called "policy activism."
The second type of activism and restraint, which is the primary focus of this article, is not concerned with a judge's view of the substantive
merits of a particular regulatory program. Rather, it involves his or her
view of the scope of the institutional competence and constitutional authority of the federal courts, in relation to similar attributes of the executive and legislature, to implement regulatory legislation. This article
measures the degree of a court's "institutional activism or restraint ' 4 by
the number of techniques that a court is willing to employ to protect the
intended beneficiaries of the statute in question and to prevent subversion
of the legislative scheme by the implementing agency.
A court inclined toward institutional activism in the implementation
of regulatory legislation displays three characteristics. First, it protects
2. The definitions of activism and restraint used in this article are limited to the context being
addressed here and do not necessarily describe, for example, a court's approach to constitutional
interpretation.
3. There are probably as many definitions of judicial "activism" and "restraint" as there are
authors who have addressed the subject. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 207 (1985) ("The term 'judicial self-restraint' could be used in at least five different
senses."). I owe my use of the dichotomy between "policy" and "institutional" activism and restraint to my colleague at the University of Kansas School of Law, Richard Levy.
4. Judge Posner divides what is referred to in this article as "institutional restraint" into two
categories, prudential and structural self-restraint. Id. at 207-08.
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statutory beneficiaries by increasing their procedural opportunities to
participate in regulatory implementation. Such a court may force the
agency to permit persons affected by its decisions to participate extensively in decisionmaking processes at the agency level. It may also expand private litigants' access to the federal courts for review of agency
decisions. Second, an activist court maximizes the substantive protection
afforded to statutory beneficiaries. It may interpret regulatory statutes
expansively or fill statutory gaps with federal common law designed to
promote the objectives reflected in the legislation. Third, a court engaged in institutional activism is relatively reluctant to defer to agency
expertise when reviewing statutory implementation, especially when the
agency reads its own statutory mandate narrowly. This reluctance may
be manifested in rigorous scrutiny of agency reasoning processes, such as
review under the "hard look" doctrine. 5 An activist court also tends to
characterize issues as legal rather than factual in nature in order to subject agency resolution of those issues to de novo judicial review.
A court with a more restrained institutional approach to review of
agency decisions will tend to exhibit the opposite three characteristics.
First, it will not favor the judicial expansion of procedural opportunities
for those affected by agency implementation of regulatory statutes. Such
a court will be unwilling to expand procedures at the agency level beyond
the requirements of due process, the Administrative Procedure Act, 6 or
applicable enabling legislation. It will restrict access to the federal courts
by those seeking review of agency decisions. Second, a restrained court
typically will be unwilling to supplement or extend the scope of statutory
provisions beyond their facial applicability. It will tend to interpret regulatory legislation narrowly and refuse to create common law to fill in
gaps left by the legislature. Third, a court exercising institutional restraint will be deferential in its review of the merits of agency decisions.
When it can, it will characterize an issue as one of fact rather than law,
since the former is typically subject to less rigorous judicial scrutiny than
the latter. 7 It will hesitate to second-guess the means chosen by the
agency to achieve statutory objectives. It might, for example, apply the
"minimum" rationality test, which requires only that the agency's decision has some conceivable, rational relationship to the applicable statu5. See infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982).
7. See Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986) (Factual issues are
subject to the substantial evidence standard of review, while legal issues are usually subject to "ple-

nary" review, which "invariably is much less deferential than is the review of findings of fact."). See
also R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4, at 370

(1985) [hereinafter "ADMINISTRATIVE LAW"].
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tory purposes" A restrained court may even afford substantial deference
to agency interpretations of the meaning of statutory provisions.
Whether a court adopts a posture of institutional activism or restraint depends in large part upon its view of the role of the judiciary in
insuring adherence to the separation of powers doctrine. An activist
court tends to focus on the federal courts' responsibility to prevent subversion of the legislative will by the executive branch. A court practicing
institutional self-restraint is typically more aware of the potential for judicial infringement upon either executive or congressional authority. 9
It is only where the applicable regulatory legislation is not clear that
a court's willingness to use what this article calls "activist" techniques
will be an accurate measure of its inclination toward institutional activism or restraint. If Congress clearly precludes the use of one of the activist techniques, even a court amenable to institutional activism
presumably will defer to that legislative judgment. If it fails to do so, it
seeks to elevate its own policy preferences over those reflected in the statute. Conversely, if Congress unequivocally orders the courts to employ a
technique associated with institutional activism, the separation of powers
doctrine should compel even a court inclined toward institutional restraint to adopt that technique. If it does not, it is probably engaging in
policy judicial activism.
B.

The Emergence of Judicial Activism in EnvironmentalLitigation
1. The Reasons for Environmental Activism

Environmental commentators remarked in the early 1970's that
"[p]resently the courts are in the 'age of judicial activism' "10 and that
"[t]he federal court system has played an extraordinarily active role in
shaping federal environmental law and in revising the methods by which
8. See, e.g., Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935) ("[I]f any state
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [an agency order], there is a presumption of
the existence of that state of facts .... ). See generally Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers Concerns and the Requirement ofAdequate Reasonsfor Agency
Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. - (forthcoming).
9. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (courts should not interfere with
agency shifts in policy or priority brought about by a change in administration, since that "is a
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations"); R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 207 (A "self-restrained" judge "believes that
the power of his court system relative to other branches of government should be reduced."). See
also Wallace, The Jurisprudence ofJudicial Restraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (1981).
10. Comment, Preservation of the Environment Through the Doctrines Governing Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 429, 447 (1971).
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federal agencies deal with environmental issues."'" This section explores
the reasons for and manifestations of the emergence of this activism by
the federal courts in environmental litigation.
The roots of judicial activism in environmental litigation lay in social attitudes toward environmental problems prevailing among the
American public in the late 1960's. As early as 1966, four years before
Earth Day 12 and the effective date of the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA"), 13 Justice Douglas noted that "there is greater concern
than ever over pollution-one of the main threats to our free-flowing
rivers and to our lakes as well."' 14 Events such as the Santa Barbara oil
spill and reports linking pesticides and toxic substances with potential
health hazards focused public attention on the need to protect the nation's environment. 15 In 1970, a prominent environmental attorney
wrote that "[t]he explosion of concern for the environment, at every private and governmental level, is the great political phenomenon of the last
16
twelve months."'
This mounting public concern over the environment prompted the
enactment of a series of new federal laws designed to prevent deteriora17
tion of environmental quality and degradation of natural resources.
11. Thompson, The Role of the Courts, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 193 (E. Dolgin &
T. Guilbert eds. 1974). See also Rosenbaum & Roberts, The Year ofSpoiled Pork" Comments on the
Court's Emergence as an Environmental Defender, 7 LAW & Soc'y REV. 33, 38 (1972) (describing
an "almost unprecedented" confidence in judicial action to achieve environmentalist goals, and "a
climate far more congenial" to such action than in the past).
12. Earth Day, April 22, 1970, symbolized a new commitment to prevent environmental degradation in the United States. See Comment, supra note 10, at 429 ("Earth Day ... marked the
beginning of a new era in American attitudes. Pollution control became the watchword for many
people who came to the realization that something must be done now in order to preserve the world
in which they live.").
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982).
14. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225 (1966).
15. Atkeson, Introduction, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 13 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert
eds. 1974). Influential books, such as C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970), and B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971), provided additional focal points for the nation's emerging
environmental consciousness.
16. Sive, Some Thoughts of an EnvironmentalLawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 612 (1970). Sive added that the "long struggle of the bird lovers and
wilderness wanderers... has become the movement of everyone everywhere for a 'liveable environment.' " Id. See also Cornwell, From Whence Cometh Our Help? Conservationists'Search for a
JudicialForum for Environmental Relief, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 451, 451 (1971) ("A strong groundswell of public opinion ... is slowly moving the United States toward a saner ecological policy.");
Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems of Environmental Quality, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1070, 1070 (1970) ("The fundamental national problems of environmental
quality are increasingly attracting fervent national awareness and concern.").
17. See statutes cited at Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 404 n. 1
(1971); Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1677 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
(1982)) (Clean Air Act); Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982)) (Clean Water Act).
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Laws such as the Clean Air and Water Acts delegated significant new
responsibilities for protecting environmental quality to the federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), while NEPA sought to inject
environmental considerations into the decisionmaking processes of all
8
agencies of the federal government.'
The mere fact that Congress assigned these new environmental responsibilities to federal administrative agencies, however, did not necessarily ensure that they would be diligently carried out. During the late
1960's and early 1970's, contemporary concern about the "capture" of
administrative agencies by the industries they regulated was widespread. 19 Critics charged, for example, that development-oriented agencies such as the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation had
been captured by the "engineering mentality" and political sensibilities of
the groups they were charged with regulating. 20 These agencies accordingly were not inclined to place much importance on environmental con21
siderations, even if ordered to do so by Congress.
Agency capture can result in a failure to implement the legislative
will. If the legislative process is viewed as an arena in which pluralistic
interest groups struggle to protect and promote their own objectives, a
particular piece of legislation is the product of a series of compromises
reached in the political bargaining among these groups. 2 2 The legislative
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982) (requiring all federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement concerning proposals for major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment).
19. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-48 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Diver,
Policymaking Paradigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 408-09 (1981) (describing a
"chorus of disaffection" in the late 1960's to the "rank favoritism or obsequiousness" that dominated
many agency decisions); Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Government Planning: JudicialReview
and Policy Formulation, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 343 (1966) ("Bureaucratic specialization leads
to parochialism, excessive preoccupation of the agency with its own goals and its own vision of the
public interest, and a disproportionate sacrifice of other social and economic interests to those it feels
itself commissioned to protect and foster."). See also Anderson, The National Environmental Policy
Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 279 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974); Comment, supra
note 10, at 429-30.
20. See, e.g., Rosenbaum & Roberts, supra note 11, at 34-36; Jaffe, The Administrative Agency
and Environmental Control, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 231, 235 (1970).
21. See E. HANKS, A. TARLOCK & J. HANKS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 194-95
(1974). The indifference of agencies whose mandate was not primarily to protect the environment to
the potential environmental consequences of their actions prompted the enactment of NEPA, a statute which was meant to force the agencies to broaden their perspective. See Sive, supra note 16, at
650 (NEPA provides a means of "curbing the power of narrowly oriented administrative agencies.").
22. This pluralist model is described extensively and criticized in Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). See also R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 262-65;

Macey, PromotingPublic-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). An institutionally restrained judge is likely to be attracted
to the pluralist model of legislation since this model implies that a judge's role in implementing
regulatory legislation should be limited to enforcing the bargain reached in the legislature. Some of
the more prominent proponents of institutional judicial restraint rely heavily on the pluralist model
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bargain is breached if the implementation of the statute is dominated by
one group or an alliance of groups involved in the bargaining process.
That kind of domination is possible where the agency in charge of statutory implementation gives disproportionate weight to the views of a particular interest group or groups. 23 If legislation is viewed as a process for
determining the public interest, 24 then the capture of an agency by one
faction may divert the agency from an attempt to serve the public interest
to an effort to promote that faction's narrower self-interest.
Two ways to protect the sanctity of the legislative bargain and to
minimize the opportunity for subverting the public interest are to expand
the opportunities of intended statutory beneficiaries to participate in, and
seek judicial review of, agency decisions. 25 Congress endorsed both techniques in environmental and other legislation of the late 1960's and early
1970's. Public access to information at the agency level was increased
through enactment of the Freedom of Information Act, 26 and agencies
27
were required to hold hearings before finalizing their decisions. Most of
the new statutes for controlling pollution contained provisions authorizing private citizens to seek judicial review of agency decisions. 28 Congress appeared to believe that the courts were more isolated than the
agencies from political pressures of special interest groups and therefore
could remedy any executive branch subversion of congressional intent
29
attributable to agency capture.
in their commentary on the legislative process. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 271, 274, 27879, 282, 289, 291, 295, 337.
23. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 32-33.
24. The "public interest" model of legislation is described in R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 26263. Proponents of institutional activism may focus on the public interest model of legislation since it
appears to envision a broader role for the courts than the pluralist model does. Under the public
interest model, the judge may be obligated to take affirmative steps to assist in promoting the public
interest reflected in the legislation.
25. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 65.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
27. See Atkeson, supra note 15, at 13-14. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 594-95 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (discussing public hearing requirements under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).
28. E.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365, 1369 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604, 7607 (1982). This kind of access
to the courts would permit an individual or group to "inform[ ] the court that some voters believe
that a particular point of view is being ignored or underestimated by the decisionmaking body."
Comment, supra note 16, at 1099.
29. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Cf
Rosenbaum & Roberts, supra note 11, at 39 (summarizing Professor Sax's view that since judges are
" 'outsiders' to the political pressures that often sway administrators," access to the courts is "a way
to shift the 'center of gravity' away from a concern with private economic interests and political
calculations among administrators and toward a concern with the public's stake in environmental
protection."). At least one Seventh Circuit opinion explicitly subscribed to this view. See Harrison
v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1121 (7th Cir. 1976) ("Courts are insulated from the
lobbying that gives strong advantages to industrial polluters when they face administrative or legislative review of their operations.").
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The federal courts, like Congress, were alert to the possibility of executive infringement upon legislative branch authority and were willing
to take aggressive steps to ensure that agency decisions were consistent
with statutory purposes. 30 The courts' willingness to intervene actively
in the regulatory process was thus in large part attributable to institutional concerns. As Judge Skelly Wright remarked in his noted opinion
in the Calvert Cliffs' case, 3 1 the essence of the courts' constitutional responsibilities was to ensure that "the promise of the new environmental
legislation will become a reality .... Our duty, in short, is to see that
important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not
32
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.
The federal courts' institutional commitment to thwarting agency
efforts to derail legislative programs was perhaps heightened by what
some contemporary commentators viewed as a special judicial sensibility
33
to an agency's failure to adequately assess environmental consequences.
The District of Columbia Circuit, which perhaps best exemplified this
sensibility, explained that "[a]gency decisions in the environmental area
touch on fundamental personal interests in life and health, and these interests have always had a special claim to judicial protection. '34 Because
some courts felt that an agency's failure to protect these important inter30. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 n.21 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See also Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (discussing judicial and agency partnership to effectuate the legislative
mandate); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (referring to
judicial and agency partnership in furtherance of the public interest); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See generally ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,
supra note 7, § 5.1.1, at 121 ("Courts aid Congress by insuring that agencies stay within the substantive boundaries established by Congress."); id. § 5.1.4, at 124 ("Judicial review of agency action is
supportive of the efforts of the legislative branch to establish and implement policy through legislative delegation of power.").
31. Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d 1109.
32. Id. at 1111. See also Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League v. AEC, 515 F.2d
513, 522 n. 11 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter
of the Izaak Walton League, Inc., 423 U.S. 12 (1975) (stating that AEC had tended to become lax in
assuring that its decisions did not adversely affect safety and noting the phenomenon of agency
capture).
33. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 11, at 211 (arguing that the Court in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), "was aware of the special place which environmental
and aesthetic concerns should play in the agency decision making."); Note, Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe: Environmental Law and the Scope of Judicial Review, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 1117, 1118 (1972) (Court's test for scope of judicial review embodies "a preference for environmental values vis-a-vis competing values"). Cf Leventhal, Environmental Decision Making and the
Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 514 (1974) (The Court did not employ a more stringent
standard of review in Overton Park because it was an environmental case. But "[t]he 'paramount
importance' attributed to environmental values serves to grab the court initially and causes the court
to be especially attentive in its review and, where necessary, to delve into the decisional process to
see whether the Government has acted to give due protection to the environment.").
34. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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ests could have far more serious consequences than agency abuses under
traditional economic regulatory legislation, they were particularly prone
to intervene actively in environmental litigation.3 5 To the extent this special judicial sensibility was motivated by the judges' personal sympathies
with the objectives of the new environmental laws, 36 the judicial activism
of the 1960's and 1970's may have had a policy as well as an institutional
component.
2.

The Techniques of Environmental Activism

The federal appellate courts in the late 1960's and early 1970's displayed all of the characteristics of institutional judicial activism in environmental litigation. 37 They expanded procedural opportunities for
private participation in agency decisionmaking, interpreted broadly the
substantive scope of environmental legislation, and subjected agency decisions to stringent judicial review.
a.

Procedural techniques

To reduce the potential for subversion by captured administrative
agencies of environmental legislative efforts, the federal courts sought "to
ensure that the administrative process itself will confine and control the
exercise of [agency] discretion. ' 38 They did so by imposing new and
more elaborate procedural requirements on EPA and on agencies responding to NEPA.3 9 Although the sources of these requirements were
not always clear, the courts were at times quite blunt in admitting that
the procedures imposed could not be traced either to the APA or to the
agencies' organic statutes. 40 One court stated that "in a particular case
35.

See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS:

A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT 21 (1973). See also Sive, supra note 16, at 643 ("there is a special
aspect of environmental rights which renders them more basic and fundamental than most other
more traditional civil rights").

36. Associate Justice Tom Clark, sitting on a Seventh Circuit panel, noted that "environmental
consciousness may be the saving prescript for our age." Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co.,

528 F.2d 1107, 1120 (7th Cir. 1976).
37. These characteristics are described at supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
38. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
39. See Diver, supra note 19, at 410-11.
40. In a case involving implementation of the Clean Air Act, for example, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded a rule to EPA so that the Administrator could supply
a more complete explanation of the basis for the rule, even though the court admitted that the
regulation's statement of basis and purpose satisfied the minimal requirements of the APA. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For other cases remanded for the
development of a fuller administrative record, see American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 46566 (7th Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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fairness may require more than the APA minimum."' 4' In other cases,
the procedural requirements were derived from creative statutory interpretations. 42 To ensure that agencies complied with their affirmative
duty to protect the public interest, 43 the courts required the agencies to
inquire into and consider all relevant facts, 44 to expand opportunities for
intervention and public comment, 4 5 and to respond to significant objec46
tions raised by commentators.
Increased procedural requirements at the agency level alone, however, could not guarantee agency adherence to the legislative mandate.
Intended statutory beneficiaries whose interests were improperly ignored
had to be able to challenge agency decisions in court. The courts expanded express statutory opportunities for judicial review by liberalizing
standing rules, recognizing implied private rights of action, and interpreting statutes that were silent on the matter to authorize judicial
review.
The relaxation of standing requirements for judicial review of
agency actions involving environmental issues began when the courts
held that a plaintiff need not prove injury to a personal economic interest
to satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirement of article III of the
Constitution. Injury to "a special interest" in aesthetic, conservational,
or recreational matters would suffice. 47 The Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. SCRAP 48 illustrated that even a plaintiff whose alleged
environmental injury had only the most tenuous connections with the
challenged agency action would receive a judicial hearing on the merits. 49 The courts apparently viewed the relaxation of standing requirements as one more technique for protecting statutory goals from the
41. Kennecott Copper, 462 F.2d at 850 n.18.
42. The requirement for the preparation of a "negative" impact statement under NEPA, for
example, is not traceable to any express statutory language. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 19598. See generally Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 648-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990
(1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1972). Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (requiring discussion of environmental consequences of alternative courses of action).
43. Scenic Hudson PreservationConference, 354 F.2d at 620.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
46. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
47. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608, 615-16 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
48. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
49. There were, of course, occasional cases in which the courts refused to recognize environmental plaintiffs' standing. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 953-55 (7th Cir. 1973).
However, by 1977, Professor Rodgers noted that the question of standing in environmental litigation
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decisions of agencies not inclined to place a high value on environmental
concerns. 50
Private access to the courts in environmental litigation was also expanded through judicial implication of private rights of action and of a
right to review of agency decisions. The Supreme Court, for example,
inferred a right to reimbursement or equitable relief for persons injured
by violations of the River and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. 51
The most significant example of the courts' recognition of an implied
right to judicial review of agency decisions arose under NEPA, where the
courts engaged in rigorous review of agency compliance despite the fact
that the statute "gives no hint whatsoever that citizens may even litigate
'5 2
the question of preparation of an impact statement.
According to one Seventh Circuit decision, these judicial efforts to
expand the rights of environmentally-aggrieved parties to obtain redress
in the courts "serve[d] as a necessary and valuable supplement to legisla53
tive efforts to restore the natural ecology of our cities and countryside.
If these efforts were based upon the courts' conclusion that Congress intended the judiciary to supplement the express statutory mechanisms for
protecting the environment, they simply reflected institutional activism.
If, however, the federal courts turned to the activist procedural techniques because they believed the measures chosen by Congress were inadequate, the courts were engaged in policy activism.
had shifted "from a significant doctrinal barrier to a nettlesome technicality." W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.6, at 23 (1977).
50. See, e.g., E. HANKS, A. TARLOCK & J. HANKS, supra note 21, at 214 (citing Vining, Direct
Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1445, 1475
(1971)) (viewing the removal of standing hurdles as "the divorce of judicial review from the core of
common law jurisprudence and the recognition of a rather broad public interest in the functioning of
government"); Rosenbaum & Roberts, supra note 11, at 41 (more expansive view of standing has
permitted public interest litigation against government agencies); Comment, supra note 16, at 1088
(the "expanded concept of standing is crucial to a judicial function of review which assures that
administrative decisions affecting environmental quality are as fully as possible responsive to competing values"). Cf Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 354 F.2d at 616 (expansive view of
"aggrieved parties" with standing to challenge FPC licensing activities is necessary to ensure that the
FPC adequately protects the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects
of power development).
51. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960). Professor Rodgers reported in 1977 that the courts "freely" and
"readily" implied private remedies under federal water pollution control legislation. W. RODGERS,
supra note 49, § 4.5, at 395, § 4.6, at 403.
52. Thompson, supra note 11, at 216. The conclusion that private litigants could seek review of
agency implementation of NEPA was not inevitable. See, e.g., Bucklein v. Volpe, 1 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,043, 20,044 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (concluding that NEPA "would not seem to create
any rights or impose any duties of which a court can take cognizance").
53. Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1120 (7th Cir. 1976).
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b.

Substantive techniques

The courts in the 1960's and 1970's also sought to protect the interests and promote the goals reflected in environmental statutes by interpreting those statutes broadly and by filling statutory gaps with federal
common law.5 4 The Supreme Court's foray into expansive statutory interpretation arose primarily under the 1899 River and Harbors Act. The
Court held that the Act's prohibition on creating an "obstruction" to
navigation5 5 applies to the deposit of industrial organic wastes 56 and that
its prohibition on the deposit of "refuse matter" into navigable waters57
covers commercially valuable gasoline, even absent proof of an adverse
effect on navigation. 5 8 Although Justice Harlan charged Justice Douglas, the author of the opinions in these cases, with engaging in policy
activism, 59 the latter denied that he was "stretching statutory language
...to meet strange conditions." 6
The lower courts produced similarly broad interpretations of the
Clean Air Act and NEPA. The Clean Air Act's program for preventing
significant deterioration, although incorporated into the statute in
1977,61 was implied from the general purposes of the statute by an earlier
federal district court decision over EPA's objection. 62 Although not all
54. According to Judge Posner, "many issues of statutory interpretation cannot be answered
deductively." R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 202. As a result, "some statutes do little more than
provide an initial impetus to the creation of bodies of frankly judge-made law." Id. He cites the
antitrust laws as an example. NEPA is surely another.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
56. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485, 489 (1960).
57. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
58. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1966). See also United States v.
Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 670-71 (1973).
59. According to Justice Harlan, the majority had "read[ ] into the statute things that actually
are not there" in order to reach what it considered a "just result." Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. at
510 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's objections reflected his adherence to institutional
restraint:
However appealing the attempt to make this old piece of legislation fit modem-day conditions may be, such a course is not a permissible one for a court of law, whose function it is
to take a statute as it finds it. The filling of deficiencies in the statute ... is a matter for
Congress, not for this Court.
Id. See also Standard Oil, 384 U.S. at 230 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (The court's decision would have
been different if it had "been content to confine itself to applying relevant rules of law and to leave
policies affecting the proper conservation of the Nation's rivers to be dealt with by the Congress.").
60. Standard Oil, 384 U.S. at 225.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (1982).
62. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aft'd, 2 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,656 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aJfd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412
U.S. 541 (1973). The District of Columbia Circuit ruled that EPA's authority to issue hazardous air
pollutant standards based on "adequately demonstrated" technology includes the power to force
emissions reductions to a level projected to be achievable through systems not currently in use.
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Professor Rodgers
has called this "a bold interpretation" of the statute. W. RODGERS, supra note 49, § 3. 10, at 270.
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courts agreed, many, including the Seventh Circuit, concluded that
NEPA was not purely a procedural statute. Under this interpretation,
the Act not only required preparation of an impact statement that adequately discussed a proposal's environmental effects; it also included a
judicially enforceable requirement that the preparing agency adhere to
63
the choices dictated by the impact statement's analysis.
In addition to interpreting environmental statutes expansively, the
courts sometimes filled statutory gaps with federal common law. The
most prominent example was Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 4 where the
Supreme Court, relying in part on Congress' increasing concern with
protecting the quality of the environment, 65 recognized the propriety of
applying a federal common law of nuisance to resolve interstate disputes
involving water pollution. 66 Thereafter, the lower federal courts frequently resorted to this body of federal common law to resolve environ67
mental disputes.
c.

Scope of judicial review

The third technique the courts used to prevent agencies from defeating legislative purposes was a rigorous scrutiny of agency reasoning. The
Supreme Court's decision in the Overton Park case 68 provided the clearest signal that, by more closely scrutinizing the substantive merit of
agency decisions under environmental statutes, the courts would act as
"aggressive overseers" of agency implementation of these laws. 69 The
courts expressed the new, heightened scope of judicial review in environ63. E.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 1973). Cf Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (courts probably cannot reverse a
substantive decision under NEPA unless the balance of costs and benefits struck by the agency was
"arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values"). See generally materials cited
in W. RoDGERS, supra note 49, § 7.5, at 738 n.1. The Supreme Court severely restricted, if not
eliminated, the courts' substantive review authority in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per curiam).
64. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
65. Id. at 101-02.
66. Id. at 103-04.
67. In several cases, the doctrine was extended to cover suits by private litigants, e.g., National
Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981); Byram River v. Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), and suits involving intrastate pollution of navigable waters. Eg., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623,
628 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U.S. 917 (1981). This case is discussed infra notes
81-94 and accompanying text. For a summary of the post-Illinois v. City of Milwaukee development
of the federal common law of nuisance, see Glicksman, FederalPreemption and Private Remediesfor
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 158 n.198 (1985).
68. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
69. W. RODGERS, supra note 49, § 1.5, at 18. See also Note, Administrative Law and Procedure--Judicial Review-Discretionary Action by Secretary of Transportation Is Subject to Judicial
Review When His Decision Creates Substantial Environmental Impact, 60 GEO. L.J. 1101, 1112
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mental cases in a variety of ways. 70 Collectively, these formulations of a
more searching scope of review became known as the "hard look doctrine, ' 71 which generally demanded that the agency accompany its decision with a clear explanation of the factors considered, the weights
assigned to them, and the reasons they dictated the decision ultimately
adopted.

72

At the same time as they were demanding more detailed explanations by the agencies, the courts felt less compelled than previously to
' 73
prostrate themselves before the "mysteries of administrative expertise."
Despite their frequent protestations of deference to the agency's resolution of complex technical and scientific issues, 74 the courts did not hesitate to form their own judgments on whether agency resolution of these
issues would promote congressional objectives. 75 A court addressing
such an issue but concerned about an agency's departure from its statutory mandate might classify the issue before it as one of law rather than
of fact. Because the courts typically engaged in a more searching inquiry
of agency legal questions than factual ones, 76 such a classification would
subject the agency's determination of the issue to relatively strict judicial
scrutiny.

77

(1972) ("The Overton Park case heralds the advent of closer scrutiny of agency actions, particularly
if statutory environmental safeguards are involved.").
70. The Supreme Court announced in Overton Park that the APA requires a court reviewing
agency rulemaking proceedings to engage in "a thorough, probing, in-depth review." Overton Park,
401 U.S. at 415. The judicial task, said some courts, was to ensure that the agency had engaged in
"reasoned decisionmaking." E.g., American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 453 (7th Cir. 1975)
(citing Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom.
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 416 U.S. 969 (1974)); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). Others referred to the courts'
obligation to inspect agency decisions pursuant to "a more searching standard" or "a more penetrating inquiry." Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973).
71. The "hard look" label originated in a non-environmental case, where Judge Leventhal described hard look review as judicial review of agency reasoning "with vigilance." Greater Boston
Television Co. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). But by
1977, one author deemed the doctrine "a catechism of environmental law." W. RODGERS, supra
note 49, § 1.5, at 19. Professor Rodgers stated that, in suits initiated under NEPA, the courts "elevated the hard look to a penetrating autopsy of agency actions affecting the environment." Id. at
23.
72. Cf Sunstein, supra note 22, at 61 (the "hard-look doctrine" currently contains four principal features: "Agencies must give detailed explanations for their decisions; justify departures from
past practices; allow participation in the regulatory process by a wide range of affected groups; and
consider reasonable alternatives, explaining why they were rejected.").
73. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See also W. RODGERS, supra note 49, § 1.5, at 17-18.
74. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 633, 647-48 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
75. See, e.g., id.; Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 374, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
76. See Diver, supra note 19, at 402 and cases cited id. at n.n. 45-46.
77. Evidence that courts engaged in manipulation of the fact-law distinction for this reason is
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The courts resorted to these techniques for increasing the stringency
of judicial review for the same reason they maximized the procedural
opportunities of statutory beneficiaries and read statutory provisions expansively: they sought to prevent agencies from basing their decisions on
factors inconsistent with or extraneous to the applicable statutory delegation. 78 Hard-look review, then, was another means of preventing agency
capture from subverting the legislative will.7 9 If such review increased
future agency adherence to statutory objectives, it would eventually reduce the need to resort to the techniques of institutional activism as a
check on agencies straying from their statutory mandate.8 0
II.

THE WAUKEGAN HARBOR LITIGATION

The federal courts' conviction that agencies could not be trusted to
take proper account of environmental values in implementing their statutory responsibilities caused them to resort frequently to the techniques of
institutional activism in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Judges in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which heard the
bulk of the environmental cases, were the leading practitioners of this
activism, but other courts, including the Seventh Circuit, also employed
the activist techniques. By the early 1980's, institutional activism in environmental litigation had declined, but not necessarily because agencies
were conforming more closely to statutory directives than they did in the
1960's and 1970's.
difficult to produce. But at least one writer in 1970 believed that the courts had begun to classify
mixed questions of fact and law in environmental cases as questions of law. See Sive, supra note 16,
at 619-31 (citing Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), affid, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970)). See also Thompson,
supra note 11, at 194.
78. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
79. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 61 (hard-look review permitted the courts to "flush out"
agency decisions which were solely the product of political pressures); Thompson, supra note 11, at
236-37.
80. See, e.g., Note, supra note 69, at 1113.
Some judges convinced of the need for and legitimacy of institutional activism in environmental
cases believed that some of the activist techniques were more likely to promote agency adherence to
legislative purposes than others. Judge Bazelon, for example, believed that "technically illiterate"
judges were incapable of engaging in meaningful substantive review of agency decisions involving
complex scientific evidence. He contended that the courts would do more to improve administrative
decision-making "by concentrating our efforts on strengthening administrative procedures." Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
See also International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Other
activists, like Judge Leventhal, countered that judges were capable of engaging in meaningful substantive review and had a responsibility to Congress to do so to assure that agencies exercised broad
delegations of power within statutory limits. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 68-69 (Leventhal, J.,
concurring). See also Leventhal, supra note 33.
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This part of the article describes a recent line of Seventh Circuit
environmental law cases involving the pollution of Waukegan Harbor.
The next part concludes that, although the Waukegan Harbor litigation
does not point uniformly in one direction, it reflects an institutional approach which contrasts with the activism characteristic of earlier environmental litigation in the federal courts. Part IV contends that the
retreat from activism displayed in the Waukegan Harbor cases and the
Seventh Circuit's other recent environmental decisions is part of a
broader movement among the federal courts toward institutional restraint based on concerns about the limits of the courts' authority and
competence.
A.

Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corporation ("OMC I")

In August 1978, Illinois sued the Outboard Marine Corporation
("OMC") in federal district court, alleging that at least since 1959, the
company had discharged toxic polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs")8 1
from its Waukegan, Illinois manufacturing facility into Waukegan Harbor and Lake Michigan. According to the state, the PCBs had accumulated in the bottom sediments of the receiving waters, causing
contamination at levels damaging to aquatic life and water quality,
threatening the health of Illinois residents, and impairing the usefulness
of the lake for recreation. Illinois sought an injunction restraining OMC
from further discharges of PCBs and directing it to remove and dispose
of the PCB-contaminated sediments and soil, relying, among other
82
things, on the federal common law of nuisance.
The district court dismissed the state's complaint. It held that
although the federal district courts have jurisdiction over a claim based
on the federal common law of nuisance, that body of law does not extend
to controversies between a state and its own residents. Absent any allegation of injury to or from another state, the court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the dispute.8 3
Before the district court dismissed Illinois' complaint, the United
States brought its own action against OMC, alleging that OMC's property constituted a threat to the environment and seeking civil penalties
81. PCBs are highly toxic chemical mixtures that are heat and flame resistant. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623, 624 n.1 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U.S. 917
(1981). Congress has authorized the EPA to regulate the manufacture, use, and disposal of PCBs
under the Toxic Substances Control Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1982). See also 40 C.F.R. Part 761
(1986).
82. 619 F.2d at 624.
83. Id.
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and injunctive relief similar to that requested by Illinois.8 4 The federal
government's suit was based on both the federal common law of nuisance
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA").8 5 When Illinois' suit was dismissed, it moved to intervene in the United States' suit,
alleging that it had a statutory right to do so under the FWPCA. 6 The
87
district court denied Illinois' motion.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed both the dismissal of Illinois' federal common law action and its motion to intervene in the federal government's suit. On the first point, the court held that a state has
a federal common law nuisance action against an in-state source polluting interstate or navigable waters.88 The court, relying upon the
Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee 1"),89 and the policies reflected in the FWPCA, concluded that the
"overriding federal interest in preserving, free of pollution, our interstate
and navigable waters" 90 justified the application of a uniform federal
common law of nuisance, even to the intrastate pollution of such waters,
to fill in the gaps of the FWPCA. 9 1 The court also held that the FWPCA
gave Illinois a statutory right to intervene in the federal government's
suit.92 This result was supported by Congress' desire to preserve to the
state "a vital role" in eliminating water pollution. 93 The court permitted
Illinois to decide whether to remain in the United States' suit upon revi94
val of the state's federal common law nuisance action.
B.

Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corporation ("OMC II")

Following the Seventh Circuit's decision in 0MC I, OMC filed a
petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Subsequently,
84. See 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1982) (authorizing EPA to sue in federal district court to immediately restrain any person causing or contributing to pollution presenting an imminent and substantial
danger to public health or welfare to stop the discharge causing the pollution or "to take such other
action as may be necessary"); id. § 1319(b), (d) (authorizing district court to assess civil penalties for
statutory violations).
85. This Act is now commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act and is codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987).
86. See id. § 1365(b)(1)(B); FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
87. 619 F.2d at 625.
88. Id. at 623-24. Two other federal circuit courts previously had held to the contrary. See
Committee for the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976); Reserve Mining
Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
89. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
90. 619 F.2d at 630.
91. Id. at 626-30.
92. Id. at 632.
93. Id. at 631-32 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).
94. 619 F.2d at 632.
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the Court held in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois ("Milwaukee I") 9 5 that
the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA pre-empted the federal common
law of nuisance in the area of water pollution.96 The Court then vacated
the OMC I decision and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for
97
reconsideration in light of Milwaukee I1.
On remand, Illinois and the United States, as amicus curiae, conceded that Milwaukee II barred the state's claim for injunctive relief
against the effects of pollution occurring since the enactment of the 1972
amendments to the FWPCA. They contended, however, that Illinois retained its rights under federal common law to abate a nuisance resulting
from the discharge of pollutants prior to 1972.98
In OMC II, the Seventh Circuit characterized the governments' arguments as "not . . unreasonable." 99 It noted that the issue raised in
this case was distinguishable from that in Milwaukee II in at least three
ways. First, unlike the discharge in Milwaukee II, OMC's discharges
were not governed by EPA effluent limitations enforceable in civil or
criminal proceedings against the polluter, since those limitations applied
only prospectively to discharges occurring after 1972. Second, Illinois
had no forum under the FWPCA's 1972 amendments to protect itself
against OMC's pre-1972 discharges. The Supreme Court's decision in
Milwaukee II had noted the availability of such a forum to the state in
that case. °° Third, the 1972 amendments did not include explicit rules
for deciding suits against polluters for pre-1972 pollution. The court felt
that the presence of similar rules governing post-1972 pollution was significant to the decision in Milwaukee 11.to
Despite these differences, the court held that Illinois' federal common law nuisance claims stemming from pre-1972 discharges were
barred by the Milwaukee 11 decision. The key question, the court said,
was whether the 1972 amendments addressed the question of pre-1972
water pollution. The court concluded that they did.102 Since Congress
95. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). For a discussion of the scope and implications of the Milwaukee II
decision, see Glicksman, supra note 67, at 159-71; Murchison, Interstate Pollution: The Need for
Federal Common Law, 6 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES 1 (1986).
96. 451 U.S. at 317. See also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981).
97. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Illinois, 453 U.S. 917 (1981).
98. Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473, 474 (7th Cir. 1982).
99. Id. at 477.
100. 451 U.S. at 324.
101. 680 F.2d at 477 (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 324).
102. The court relied on several provisions of the 1972 amendments, which authorized EPA to
arrange for the removal of in-place toxic pollutants in harbors and navigable waterways (33 U.S.C.
§ 1265); authorized EPA to enter into agreements with states and municipalities to demonstrate the
feasibility of removing pollutants from the Great Lakes (id. § 1258(a)); directed EPA to develop
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had comprehensively addressed the issue of pollution, including pre-1972
pollution, of navigable waterways, Illinois' federal common law nuisance
03
claim was pre-empted.
C.

Outboard Marine Corporation v. Thomas ("OMC III")

While the Seventh Circuit was considering the issue in OMC II, the
federal government's suit against OMC proceeded through discovery. In
January 1982, the government amended its complaint to add a claim
based on section 106 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 1° which authorizes the government to seek abatement of an imminent and substantial
endangerment to public health or the environment because of the release
of a hazardous substance. 10 5 After the issuance of the decision in OMC
II, the district court dismissed the United States' federal common law
nuisance claims,10 6 but refused to dismiss the government's statutory
10 8
claims under the FWPCA 10 7 or the CERCLA.
In December 1982, EPA issued its first National Priorities List of
leaking hazardous waste sites under the CERCLA.10 9 This List contains
sites which, because of the risk they pose to public health or the environment, merit the highest priority in the allocation of Superfund cleanup
resources. 110 The contaminated portion of Waukegan Harbor adjacent
practical methods for eliminating the effects of pollutants from in-place or accumulated sources (id.
§ 1255(a)); and authorized federal funds for state cleanup projects under EPA guidelines (id.
§ 1324). See 680 F.2d at 476-78.
103. 680 F.2d at 480. OMC also urged the court to reverse its holding in OMC I that Illinois
had a statutory right to intervene in the United States' FWPCA action against OMC under
§ 505(b)(1)(B) of that Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). The court refused to do so. It concluded that,
to the extent the Milwaukee H decision was relevant, it supported the court's earlier holding on the
intervention issue. The Supreme Court's emphasis on the comprehensiveness of the statute, to the
exclusion of other remedies, suggested that courts should read the FWPCA's remedial provisions
expansively. OMC argued that the FWPCA only authorized intervention in a suit "to require compliance" with the statute. Since the federal government's suit sought to ameliorate the effects of past
discharges, the intervention provision therefore was inapplicable. The court disagreed, characterizing the United States' suit as an effort "to seek prospective relief from the effects of past discharges."
680 F.2d at 480-81.
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
105. Id. § 9606(a) (1982).
106. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1032 (N.D. I1. 1982).
107. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Il. 1982).
108. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. 11. 1982).
109. See United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497, 500 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 457 (1986).
110. The CERCLA requires EPA to include in its national contingency plan for cleaning up
releases from hazardous waste disposal sites criteria for determining priorities among releases or
threatened releases throughout the United States for the purpose of taking remedial action. 42
U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 105(a)(l)-(2), 100 Stat. 1613, 1625
(1986). Based on those criteria, EPA must identify facilities that are the "top priority among known
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to OMC's facilities was ranked eighty-second among the 540 listed sites.
Illinois then designated this site as its top priority among all Illinois
Superfund sites.' 1' At that point, in February 1983, EPA moved to dismiss its CERCLA section 106 claim without prejudice. The agency felt
that, because of the time necessary to complete discovery, conduct a trial,
and appeal the result, the implementation of remedial work at the
Waukegan site would be delayed for another three to four years.11 2 EPA
proposed instead to clean up the PCBs itself, using its authority under
section 104 of the CERCLA,11 3 and later sue OMC under section 107 of
the Act 14 for reimbursement of any cleanup costs incurred. The government also requested that the district court stay the remainder of the action for injunctive relief pending the completion of EPA proceedings
under the CERCLA. The court stayed consideration of EPA's requests
to give EPA time to issue its plan for cleaning up Waukegan Harbor. I5
After more than a year of study, EPA concluded in May 1984 that it
would engage in a $21 million cleanup project, to include dredging the
harbor and storage of the PCB-contaminated sediments both on and off
the OMC facilities. 1 6 Early the next year, EPA sought access to the
OMC complex for the purpose of surveying, soil testing for weight-bearing, and design specification work in preparation for actual construction. 117 When OMC refused access to the agency, EPA applied ex parte
for a warrant for entry and investigation. The magistrate issued the war-.
rant, but OMC continued to refuse to admit EPA onto its property, and
the company filed suit in federal district court to enjoin EPA from exeresponse targets." Id. § 9605(a)(8)(B), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 105(a)(3), 100 Stat. 1613,
1625 (1986).
111.

789 F.2d at 500. To the extent practicable, EPA's National Priorities List must include

among the 100 highest priority facilities the site designated by each state as the one presenting the
greatest danger to public health or welfare or the environment in that state. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(a)(8)(B) (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 105(a)(3), 100 Stat. 1613, 1625 (1986).
112. 789 F.2d at 500.

113. This section generally authorizes EPA to take actions in response to the release or
threatened release of hazardous substances which are necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 104(a),

100 Stat. 1613, 1617-18 (1986).
114.

That section describes four categories of persons, including owners of facilities from which

a release of hazardous substances occurs, who may be liable in an action in federal district court to
reimburse cleanup costs incurred by the federal government, a state government, or a private party.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 107(a)-(b), 100 Stat. 1613, 1628-29
(1986).
115. 789 F.2d at 500.
116. Id. at 500-01.
117. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883, 885-86 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated and

remanded, 107 S.Ct. 638 (1986). The actual remedial operations would entail years of treatment of
the contaminated sediments in lagoons and facilities to be constructed by EPA on OMC's property,

as well as the erection of a permanent 15-foot high containment cell, which would occupy 6 acres of
the OMC parking lot. Id. at 885.
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cuting the warrant. The company appealed the district court's denial of
a preliminary injunction to the Seventh Circuit."I 8
On appeal, the government contended that sections 104(a), (b), and
(e) of the CERCLA 119 authorized it to enter OMC's property to engage
in the preliminary investigation and other work necessary to prepare for
the actual remedial action. Although it did not concede that its preliminary work constituted a taking of OMC's property, EPA argued that
even if it did, the taking was authorized by statute, and therefore the
company's sole remedy was a suit under the Tucker Act 120 for compensation.12 1 Furthermore, EPA claimed compensation need not precede the
taking. 122 Thus, according to the agency, OMC failed to show any likelihood of success on the merits and its request for a preliminary injunction
123
was properly refused.
In OMC 111, 124 a panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial
court and remanded for issuance of a preliminary injunction against
EPA's execution of the warrant. The court rejected EPA's Tucker Act
argument because that contention assumed statutory authorization for
the entry onto OMC's property. According to the court, however, "the
EPA lacks the authority to enter as the warrant adds nothing when the
125
statute provides nothing."'
Of the three provisions relied upon by EPA, the court construed
section 104(a) as "merely a general grant of power for remedial action"
which contains no express right of entry for the agency. 126 Section
104(b), although it grants to EPA the power to "undertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information gathering as
[it] may deem necessary or appropriate,"' 127 was inapplicable since it
grants these authorities for the purposes of identifying the existence,
source, and nature of the hazard. These purposes had already been accomplished at the OMC site. 128 Section 104(b) also vests in EPA the
118. Id. at 886-87.
119.

42 U.S.C. § 9604(a), (b), (e) (1982).

120. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982). The Tucker Act gives the United States Claims Court jurisdiction
to render monetary judgments against the United States in non-tort causes of action based on federal
law.
121. 773 F.2d at 887.
122. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2880 (1984) (citing Hurley v. Kincaid,

285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932)).
123. 773 F.2d at 887.
124. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded,

107 S. Ct. 638 (1986).
125. Id. at 888.
126. Id. at 888-89.

127. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1982).
128. 773 F.2d at 889.
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power to "undertake such planning, . . . engineering, architectural, and
other studies or investigations as [EPA] deem[s] necessary or appropriate
to plan and direct response actions ... and to enforce the provisions of
[the CERCLA].' ' 129 The court noted, however, that the section does not
expressly include a right of entry to carry out these planning and other
responsibilities, and it rejected the district court's conclusion that such a
right must necessarily be implied to permit EPA to execute its statutory
mandate. 130 The court construed the portion of section 104(e)(1) granting EPA access to private property to include only the power to copy
records. Any authority to take samples does not encompass the right to
take subsurface samples to determine what construction the land can
support.131 Doubting that EPA even had the power to enter the property
to engage in final remedial action, the court refused to "rewrite the statute" to give EPA a right of entry in a nonemergency situation to assist it
132
in preliminary design specification work.
D.

United States v. Outboard Marine Corporation ("OMC IV")

Shortly after EPA formulated its $21 million cleanup proposal in
May 1984, the agency renewed its motion to the district court to dismiss
without prejudice the government's civil action against OMC for injunctive relief and civil penalties. OMC opposed the motion, contending that
it would be improper to dismiss without prejudice after so much time
and expense had been expended for trial. OMC requested that the dis133
trict court either set the case for trial or dismiss it with prejudice.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1982).
130. 773 F.2d at 889.
131. Id. at 889-90.
132. Id. at 890-91. The government had conceded in response to OMC's request for admission
of facts that it had no scientific proof that the PCBs in the harbor had caused harm to any persons.
See 789 F.2d at 499. The court in OMC III concluded, based on this admission, that "[tihere is no
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because
of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance. If there is an emergency, it is almost ten
years old." 773 F.2d at 886. But cf. 789 F.2d at 499 (noting that the government did not admit that
the PCBs would not present a potential threat to health or the environment in the future).
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986), includes new provisions broadening EPA's investigatory authority. The Amendments
expressly authorize EPA to enter private property "for the purposes of determining the need for
response, or choosing or taking any response action under [the CERCLA], or otherwise enforcing
the provisions of [the CERCLA]." Id. § 104(m), 100 Stat. at 1622 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(e)(1)) (1986). EPA may enter any facility or property (a) where any hazardous substance has
been generated, stored, treated, disposed of, or transported from; (b) where a hazardous substance
has been or may have been released; and (c) where entry is needed to determine the need for response
or to effectuate a response action under the CERCLA. Id. Furthermore, entry onto property adjacent to such a facility or property is authorized. Id. This authority appears sufficient to encompass
the entry authorized by the warrant in OMC I1.
133. 789 F.2d at 501.
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The district court initially dismissed with prejudice the counts in the
government's complaint requesting injunctive relief, but indicated that
the dismissal would not bar a future cost recovery action against OMC
under section 107 of the CERCLA. 34 OMC then filed a motion to reconsider on the ground that the dismissal of the injunctive counts barred
a cost recovery suit due to the res judicata effect of the dismissal. In
response, the government suggested that, to avoid the resjudicata issue,
the district court dismiss the request for injunctive relief without prejudice, on the condition that both the federal government and Illinois execute a covenant not to sue OMC except for a possible cost recovery
action arising from the removal of PCBs in Waukegan Harbor.1 35 The
district court agreed.
On appeal, OMC contended that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing without prejudice. According to OMC, the United
States failed to provide sufficient justification for dropping its suit for
injunctive relief, pursuing its own cleanup of the harbor, and planning on
a section 107 cost recovery action against OMC at the completion of the
cleanup. OMC asserted that the true reason for the government's change
of course was the recognition that it would lose the pending section 106
action for injunctive relief on the merits.' 36 The company requested that
the district court be ordered to dismiss the injunctive claim with prejudice, and argued that the resjudicata effect of such a dismissal would also
bar a subsequent section 107 cost recovery action. 137
In United States v. OutboardMarine Corp. ("OMC IV"),138 a panel
of the Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without prejudice, conditioned on the government's
execution of a covenant not to sue. 139 The court concluded that the years
of anticipated litigation over the injunctive claims, balanced against the
"overwhelming interest of the government in protecting the environment
from further irreparable damage" from the PCBs in Waukegan Harbor,
justified the government's decision to clean up the harbor itself and then
possibly seek cost reimbursement from OMC. The court believed that
134. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 104 F.R.D. 405 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
135. See United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497, 501-02 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 457 (1986).
136. Id. at 502-03. OMC also argued that since 1982, the government had the authority to clean
up the harbor itself and seek reimbursement for its removal costs under the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1259, 1265, 1321 (1982). Having consciously decided to bypass this remedy, the government should not be permitted to change its mind after years of expensive litigation. 789 F.2d at 50203.
137. 789 F.2d at 507-08.
138. 789 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 457 (1986).
139. Id. at 507.
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the district court properly deferred to Congress' grant of discretion to
EPA to determine the most economical and feasible means of using the
government's limited resources to remedy the pollution problems at hazardous waste sites.140 The court rejected OMC's contention that it had
been unfairly prejudiced by the time and expense incurred in litigating
the injunctive claims, noting that the company had "actively participated" in causing this "litigation nightmare."' 41 The court did not agree
that OMC clearly would have prevailed in a trial of the injunctive
claims,1 42 and noted that in any event OMC would be able to raise the
same defenses in a section 107 cost recovery action as in a section 106
143
suit for injunctive relief.
III.

THE WAUKEGAN HARBOR DECISIONS AND

INSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINT

The Waukegan Harbor litigation indicates that the Seventh Circuit
is more reluctant than previously to use each of the techniques of institutional activism to promote the objectives of federal environmental statutes. Whereas courts committed to institutional activism seek to expand
the opportunities of environmental statutory beneficiaries to seek judicial
review, thus increasing litigation, the Seventh Circuit's opinions seem
designed to reduce the volume of litigation currently burdening the
court. The OMC decisions also reflect an unwillingness to expand the
substantive scope of environmental legislation; the Seventh Circuit's reluctance to interpret statutory provisions expansively or to fill legislative
gaps with federal common law is evident. Finally, although the OMC
cases present somewhat conflicting evidence, the Seventh Circuit may be
more inclined than earlier federal courts were in environmental litigation
to defer to the expertise of the implementing agency, at least where the
agency interprets its statutory authority narrowly. The Seventh Circuit's
reduced reliance on the techniques of institutional activism appears to
stem from its emphasis on the need for judicial economy and its fear of
usurping the authority of the legislative and executive branches.

140. Id. at 503-04.
141.

Id. at 504.

142. Id. at 505.
143. Id. at 506. These defenses would include an inquiry into the cost effectiveness of the
cleanup proposed or undertaken by the government. See id. Having concluded that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss with prejudice, the court did not reach the
issue of the resjudicata effect of such a dismissal. Id. at 508.
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A.

InstitutionalRestraint and Economy of JudicialResources

The Waukegan Harbor cases reflect the Seventh Circuit's desire to
economize on judicial resources and, ultimately, to reduce the volume of
litigation before the court. 44 The decision in OMC I appears at first
glance to be inconsistent with this desire; the court there recognized Illinois' right to sue OMC under the federal common law of nuisance. The
court held as it did, however, in part because permitting Illinois to sue on
this theory would allow consolidation of suits brought by the United
States and Illinois (and perhaps of OMC's third party complaint against
the company that manufactured the PCBs), "thus conserving scarce judi' 45
cial resources."'
The holdings in the OMC cases also reflect the Seventh Circuit's
tendency to read Supreme Court precedents expansively, a practice
which, although institutionally neutral, is generally likely to reduce litigation in the long run. In both OMC I and OMC II, the court declined
to distinguish Supreme Court decisions concerning the availability of federal common law nuisance actions. In neither case had the Supreme
Court directly addressed the issue before the Seventh Circuit. In both,
the arguments for distinguishing the earlier Supreme Court precedents
were at least plausible. 46 Yet, in both cases, the court expressed its reluctance to narrowly interpret those precedents. 47 In OMC I, the court
stated that the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Milwaukee I 48 coln144. In a recent decision not involving environmental issues, Judge Posner indicated that mounting federal caseloads make it imperative that the courts impose sanctions on those bringing groundless litigation. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986).
145. OMC I, 619 F.2d at 630. See also id. (court's holding might "promote economy of judicial
administration" as well as uniformity in result). In 0MC IV, the court referred disparagingly to the
eight-year history of the OMC case as a "litigation nightmare." 789 F.2d at 504. The Seventh
Circuit's decisions in other recent environmental cases reflect the same concern with judicial economy. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1986) (refusing to permit
piecemeal review of a single EPA order in more than one suit); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA,
21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1487, 1489 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Judicial economy would be disserved by
having different aspects of the same order reviewed in different courts at once .. ").Cf.New York
v. EPA, 716 F.2d 440, 445 (7th Cir. 1983) (after noting that New York had filed eight suits in
challenging EPA's approval of air pollutant emissions increases from mid-western sources, the court
noted that an administrative proceeding under the Clean Air Act, which provided a "consolidated
forum" for New York's allegations, was the proper forum to challenge the emissions increases).
146. See, e.g., OMC II, 680 F.2d at 477 (Illinois' attempt to distinguish Milwaukee II was "not
an unreasonable one."); supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., OMC 1, 619 F.2d at 626 (the court is "not so bold" as to assume that language in
Milwaukee I was merely dictum); id. at 629 (refusing to "put[ ] a gloss on the Supreme Court holding in [Milwaukee 1]that would restrict its application"); OMC II, 680 F.2d at 478 ("we cannot
hold, after [Milwaukee I1]that the federal common law of nuisance continues to afford a remedy for
[pre-1972] discharges"); id. at 478 n.8 (distinguishing the decision in Milwaukee II would render the
analysis in that case "meaningless").
148. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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pelled the conclusion that Illinois had a federal common law nuisance
cause of action against an in-state pollution source, even though Milwaukee I involved a suit by one state against a municipal polluter located in
another state. 149 In the short run, the holding in 0MC I would appear to
promote litigation in the federal courts, since it made a federal common
law nuisance action available in a wider range of disputes. Proponents of
institutional judicial restraint contend, however, that more generally, the
laws will be more certain and predictable if the courts routinely interpret
Supreme Court holdings broadly and apply them to factual situations
distinct from the one addressed by the Court than if they interpret
Supreme Court precedents narrowly and independently assess on a case50
by-case basis whether to adhere to or distinguish those precedents.1
Uncertainty concerning the status of the law tends to promote litigation
while certainty discourages it. '5' Subsequent to the 0MC I decision, the
Supreme Court held in Milwaukee II that the 1972 amendments to the
Clean Water Act pre-empted the federal common law of nuisance in the
area of water pollution. 1 52 The Seventh Circuit then held in 0MC II that
the statute pre-empted federal common law remedies even for nuisances
resulting from discharges that occurred before 1972. 153 The Seventh Circuit's tendency toward broad interpretation of Supreme Court opinions
54
has continued in more recent environmental cases.'
B. InstitutionalRestraintand the Reluctance to Usurp Legislative and
Executive Authority
Two other characteristics of institutional judicial restraint surface in
the Waukegan Harbor cases. Both stem from the court's wariness of
invading the law and policy-making province of the legislative and executive branches. First, the 0MC cases appear to indicate that the Seventh
Circuit is not as inclined as an institutionally activist court might be to
interpret environmental statutes broadly or to supplement such statutes
through the creation of common law rights or remedies. Second, the
149. 619 F.2d at 625-30. The court took a similarly expansive view of the Milwaukee I case in
City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub
nom. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro Sewer Dist. v. City of Evansville, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
There the Court made the federal common law of nuisance available to municipal as well as state
plaintiffs. Id. at 1018-19.
150. See R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 252; Wallace, supra note 9, at 14.
151. See R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 255.
152. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
153. 680 F.2d at 480.
154. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1196 (1985) (Illinois' state common law claims against Milwaukee were pre-empted by 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act).
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court is more inclined than an institutionally activist court would be to
defer to agency expertise when reviewing questions of statutory implementation. 55 The court may refuse to defer, however, when the agency
interprets its authority broadly, since deference in that situation would
conflict with the court's tendency to retreat from broad statutory construction as a means of promoting environmental legislative objectives.
Two of the 0MC opinions demonstrate the Seventh Circuit's reluctance to interpret environmental statutes broadly or to supplement such
statutes with rights or remedies not expressly sanctioned by Congress. In
0MC III, the court refused to interpret EPA's investigatory authority
under the CERCLA to include the right to enter a privately-owned disposal site to plan a hazardous waste cleanup operation.' 56 Finding the
applicable CERCLA provisions' 57 unambiguous, the court declined to
act as "a committee to consider statutory amendments."'' 58 Similarly, in
0MC II, following the Supreme Court's decision in Milwaukee II, the
court refused to supplement the Clean Water Act's mechanisms for dealing with pre-1972 pollutant discharges by affording federal common law
remedies to Illinois. The lesson of Milwaukee II, the court said, "is that
once Congress has addressed a national concern, our fundamental com155. The OMC III decision illustrates a third technique of institutional self-restraint attributable
to the court's desire to steer clear of confrontations with the legislature-statutory interpretation to
avoid raising serious constitutional questions. The court interpreted EPA's investigatory authority
narrowly under the CERCLA in part to avoid having to address whether EPA's entry onto and use
of OMC's property constituted a compensable taking of property. See OMC 11, 773 F.2d at 890.
See generally R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 285 ("Construing legislation to avoid constitutional questions, as well as to avoid actual nullification, is thus one of those buffering devices by which the
frictions created by the institution of judicial review are minimized.").
156. The court rejected EPA's "selective and expanded" reading of the statute to the contrary.
773 F.2d at 889.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a), (b), (e) (1982).
158. OMC III, 773 F.2d at 890. The court stated that it would not, "out of a zeal to rid our
environment of its hazards, rewrite the statute for the EPA. Congress is very capable of doing that."
Id. Congress in fact demonstrated that capability when it expanded EPA's investigatory authority
to include a right of entry on private property in the 1986 amendments to the CERCLA. See Pub.
L. No. 99-499, § 104(m), 100 Stat. 1613, 1622 (1986); supra note 132.
Other recent environmental decisions by the Seventh Circuit reflect the same fear that investing
EPA with authority not apparent on the face of the statute through expansive statutory interpretation would involve the court in a legislative function. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723
F.2d 1303, 1309 (7th Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. Indiana-Kentucky Elec. Corp., 716 F.2d 1145, 1154
(7th Cir. 1983). But see Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 998 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1196 (1985) (the Clean Water Act "should be liberally construed to achieve its objectives").
This fear is not confined to environmental litigation. See, e.g., Community & Economic Dev. Ass'n
v. Suburban Cook County Area Agency on Aging, 770 F.2d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Simmons v. ICC, 766 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1985)) (If Comprehensive Older Americans Act Amendments of 1978 are to be supplemented for the benefit of existing providers of health care services for
the elderly, "it must be done by Congress, not the courts."); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875,
885-86 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Hand, How FarIs a Judge Freein Rendering a Decision, in THE SPIRIT
OF LIBERTY 103, 108 (Dilliard 3d ed. 1960)) ("But judges are not authorized to amend statutes even
to bring them up to date"; to do so constitutes "judicial usurpation" of legislative power.).
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mitment to the separation of powers precludes the courts from scrutinizing the sufficiency of the congressional solution."' 159
The decision in OMC IV reflects the court's inclination to defer to
agency expertise in reviewing issues of statutory implementation. The
Seventh Circuit, like the other federal courts, typically defers to the
60
agency on its resolution of factual issues involving technical matters'
and in its right to make policy choices delegated to it or left unaddressed
by Congress.1 6 1 The court in OMC IV accordingly deferred to EPA's
determination that the PCB deposits in Waukegan Harbor presented a
threat of irreparable harm to the public health and the environment and
to its choice of the appropriate mechanism for minimizing this threat
most effectively-through EPA cleanup followed by a section 107 cost
recovery action against OMC, rather than through continuation of
1 62
EPA's section 106 action for injunctive relief.
The OMC decisions indicate that the degree of deference the Seventh Circuit deems appropriate in judicial review of an agency's conclusions of law is only slightly narrower. Judicial attempts to explain the
standard of review applied to questions of statutory interpretation have
done little to dispel the confusion surrounding this issue.' 63 The Seventh
Circuit's statements in recent environmental cases appear no less than
schizophrenic. In some instances, the court regards issues of statutory
interpretation as subject to de novo judicial review, since the agency has
no more expertise in interpreting statutory language than a court does. 164
In the bulk of the court's recent environmental decisions addressing the
issue, however, the Seventh Circuit does afford considerable deference to
159. OMC II, 680 F.2d at 478. As the court interpreted Milwaukee 11, federal common law "is
thus appropriate only when a court is compelled to consider a federal question to which Congress
has not provided an answer." Id. at 475.
160. See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 716 F.2d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 1983) (concerning EPA's choice of
a short-range model for assessing the impact of emissions on air quality).
161. See, e.g., Cerro Copper Prods. Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 766 F.2d 1060, 1067 (7th Cir. 1985);
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Costle, 715 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1983).
162. OMC IV, 789 F.2d at 503-04 (emphasizing EPA's discretion in determining the most efficient uses of Superfund resources and in assessing the kind of action demanded by placement of a
hazardous waste site on the NPL).
163. Professor Rodgers suggests that the following "rule" can be derived from environmental
cases: courts "sometimes defer, sometimes not, depending upon indeterminate judicial inclinations
of the moment." W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.3, at 34 (1986). See
generally Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986).
164. See, e.g., Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 594 F.2d 636, 637 (7th Cir. 1979); Porter
County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League v. AEC, 515 F.2d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub
nor. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, Inc., 423
U.S. 12 (1975). Cf. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303, 1309 (7th Cir. 1983) (since issue
of statutory interpretation is not a technical one, automatic deference to the agency's view is inappropriate). See generally Edwards, Judicial Review of Deregulation, 11 N. Ky. L. REV. 229, 256
(1984) (concerning judicial review of agency decisions based on statutory language and purpose).
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EPA's interpretation of its authorizing legislation. 65
It has been suggested that the confusion surrounding the formulation of a standard for the scope of judicial review of agency conclusions
of law stems from the failure to recognize that "conclusions of law" often
encompass a mixture of factual determination, statutory interpretation,
and policy formulation. 166 Some judges and administrative law scholars
contend that judicial deference to an agency's legal conclusions is often
appropriate for two reasons, one relating to the court's competence and
the other to the scope of its authority. First, the agency may have greater
expertise than a court. To the extent that "conclusions of law" actually
encompass the determination of complex factual matters, the court
should defer to the agency's comparatively greater expertise on technical
matters. 167 Even when an agency decision involves a more purely legal
component, judicial deference is appropriate because the agency develops
over time an expertise concerning the ways in which statutory provisions
interrelate and the effects of a particular statutory interpretation on the
agency's ability to achieve statutory objectives. 16 Second, deference to
agency legal conclusions may be dictated by the need to avoid judicial
usurpation of legislative and executive branch authority. Many statutory
provisions are not amenable to straight-forward, clear-cut interpretation.
Congressional use of vague or ambiguous language in effect constitutes a
legislative delegation of policy-making authority to the implementing
agency. Judicial second-guessing of agency interpretations in these situations may amount to little more than substitution of the court's own policies for those Congress empowered the agency to make. 169 In other
words, a refusal to defer would stray beyond the bounds of legitimate
institutional activism into unauthorized policy activism. The Seventh
Circuit's recent environmental decisions indicate that it is inclined to de170
fer to agency conclusions of law for both of these reasons.
165. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 1187, 1189 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub
norn. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 466 U.S. 980 (1984); Public Serv. Co. v. EPA, 682 F.2d 626,
632 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1129 (1983); United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d
283, 293 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980).
166. See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, § 7.1, at 351; id. § 7.4.3, at 375; W. RODGERS,
supra note 163, § 4.3A, at 32-34. See generally NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d
Cir. 1961) (concerning controversy over whether application of legal standards to facts is question of
law or fact); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546-50 (1965).
167. See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, § 7.4.3, at 377; Kaufman, Judicial Review of
Agency Action: A Judge's Unburdening,45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 201, 203 (1970).
168. See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, § 7.4.3, at 377 (citing Woodward & Levin, In
Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329 (1979)); Breyer,

supra note 163, at 368-69.
169. See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, § 7.1, at 351-52; id. § 7.4.3, at 375-76; Breyer,

supra note 163, at 369-70.
170. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1986) (deferring to
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The Seventh Circuit's predisposition to defer to agency legal conclusions should not be equated, however, with unlimited judicial deference. 171 As a matter of due process and to ensure the availability of
meaningful judicial review, the court continues to insist that the agency
1 72
provide a statement clearly explaining the reasons for its conclusions.
If the agency's explanation reveals that its action is irreconcilable with its
73
governing statutory authority, the court will take the agency to task.
Thus, in OMC III, where EPA's right to enter private waste sites
presented an issue of law easily segregable from any of the agency's factual or policy determinations, the court afforded no deference at all to the
agency's legal conclusion.1 74 Because "[t]he statute is not as ambiguous
as it is lacking," 175 the court refused to provide EPA with the help it
176
needed to accomplish its "noble purposes."'
The court in OMC III may have overcome its hesitation to secondguess the agency's statutory interpretation because deference to the
agency's view of its authority under the CERCLA would have prevented
the court from following its inclination to construe regulatory statutes
narrowly. The court's refusal to redraft what it viewed as a narrowly
drawn statute prevailed over the tendency, reflected in other environmenEPA's technical expertise in disapproving state's proposed methodology for meeting particulate
emission limitations applicable to steel producers' coke ovens); River Rd. Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1283 (1986) (deferring to agency's
decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS") concerning proposed construction of temporary barge fleeting facility, in part because the agency's decision involved interpretation
of NEPA's requirement that an EIS be prepared for actions with potential for a "significant" environmental impact, a concept with "no determinate meaning." The statute's interpretation involved
predictive judgments that should be set aside only upon proof of abuse of discretion.).
171. See, e.g., NLRB v. Indianapolis Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 802 F.2d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Although the substantial evidence tests accords the agency "considerable discretion, it does not
mean that we will simply rubber-stamp its decisions, thereby substituting judicial abdication for
judicial review.").
172. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 638 F.2d 994, 1004 (7th Cir. 1980).
173. See, e.g., Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1986), where the court ordered the
Army Corps of Engineers to reconsider its decision to issue a permit to build a facility for transloading coal from trucks to barges on the Mississippi River. According to the court, the Corps' conclusions were "entirely indifferent to the facts," id. at 642, and were based on "a record of
miscalculations followed by recalculations apparently intended only to bolster a decision already
made." Id. at 643.
174. Instead, the court's rather sarcastic if not strident opinion derides what the court regarded
as EPA's attempt to circumvent the limits on its statutory authority. See, e.g., OMC III, 773 F.2d at
888 (EPA's "ingenious" separation of its remedial operation into two phases was an attempt to begin
cleanup "without its lack of authority being so obvious.").
175. Id. at 890.
176. Id. at 890-91. In two cases where the court considered the limits on the scope of EPA's
investigatory authority to be less clear, the court deferred to EPA's statutory interpretations. See
CED's Inc. v. EPA, 745 F.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1984) (Clean
Air Act gives EPA the authority to inspect and copy records of manufacturer of device that can be
used improperly to replace catalytic converter in automotive exhaust systems); Mobil Oil Corp., 716
F.2d 1187 (Clean Water Act permits EPA to sample untreated wastestreams at petroleum refinery).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

tal cases, to defer to EPA. 177 The court's fear of interfering with executive branch discretion was overcome by its conviction that acceptance of
EPA's view would constitute usurpation of Congress' authority to define
the scope of EPA's investigatory authority. Despite the Seventh Circuit's refusal to defer to EPA's legal conclusions, then, the OMC III deci78
sion may ultimately reflect the exercise of institutional restraint.1
IV.

THE RETREAT FROM INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM:

A BROADER VIEW
The late 1960's and early 1970's witnessed a flurry of institutional
judicial activism in environmental litigation. The federal courts employed a variety of techniques to minimize the opportunities of administrative agencies to interfere with new congressional mechanisms to
protect the environment. The Seventh Circuit's decisions in the Waukegan Harbor litigation between 1980 and 1986, along with its opinions in
other recent environmental cases, depict a court which apparently believes its role in the process of statutory implementation should be much
more circumscribed than previously. This retreat, however, is not
unique to environmental litigation. Rather, it is part of a broader movement, led by the Supreme Court and exemplified by Seventh Circuit decisions in non-environmental cases, which has been motivated by judicial
concerns that the earlier institutional activism overstepped the bounds of
both judicial authority and competence.
A.

The Retreat from InstitutionalActivism in
EnvironmentalLitigation

While the institutional judicial activism of the late 1960's and early
1970's was not confined to environmental litigation, judicial awareness of
Congress' strong commitment to environmental protection measures undoubtedly spurred the use of activist techniques to help achieve the
objectives of the new environmental laws. 179 Judicial perception of a
177. Similarly, in OMC I, the desire for certainty, and a reduction in litigation, through expansive interpretation of Supreme Court precedents resulted in the creation of federal common law
rights and expanded access to the federal courts. The court was ultimately able to have its cake and
eat it, too, however, when the Supreme Court's decision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304 (1981) and the OMC II decision slammed shut the door on federal common law nuisance
actions.
178. A less charitable characterization of OMC III would be that it reflects judicial hostility to
what the court perceives as an undue and burdensome intrusion on the rights of a regulated business
and a private property owner, and thus represents an example of tortured statutory construction
based on policy activism.
179. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
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shift in this legislative commitment might account for the recent retreat
from institutional activism in the Seventh Circuit's environmental cases.
But legislative interest in and commitment to pollution control have
not declined; Congress reauthorized and strengthened the Resource Con81
servation and Recovery Act in 1984,180 the Safe Drinking Water Act
and the CERCLA 18 2 in 1986, and the Clean Water Act in 1987.183 Furthermore, Congress has not reduced the judiciary's role in implementing
environmental legislation. The legislature initially authorized judicial review of agency decisions with environmental consequences in part because it distrusted the willingness of administrative agencies to take
account conscientiously of the potential environmental consequences of
their decisions. 184 The implementation of the CERCLA by former EPA
Administrator Anne Gorsuch-Burford raised congressional distrust of
that agency to an all-time high. 8 5 In the few instances in which statutory reauthorizations have altered the role of the courts, Congress has
increased, not decreased, private access to the courts concerning environ1 86
mental matters.
It is somewhat more difficult to assess whether prevailing judicial
187
attitudes toward environmental protection legislation have changed.
The election of President Reagan in 1980 brought into power an administration that was more hostile than previous administrations were to government regulation of business.' 88
Regulation in areas such as
environmental protection was deemed appropriate only to the extent that
those proposing to regulate could demonstrate that the benefits it pro180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 642 (1986).
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987).
See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.

185. See generally SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY: REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE OVER
EPA DOCUMENTS, ABUSES IN THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM, AND OTHER MATTERS (Comm. Print

1984). This distrust has been reflected in the increased rise of legislative deadlines to force EPA to
act. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 116, 100 Stat. 1613, 1653-54 (1986).
186. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 206, 100 Stat. 1613, 1703-05 (1986) (adding a citizen suit
provision to the CERCLA for the first time).
187. It is clear that broader public attitudes have not. Opinion polls indicate that public support
for government regulation to protect the quality of the nation's natural resources is very strong and
growing stronger. See, e.g., Oakes, Back to Environmentalism, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1986, at 21,
col. 2.

188. See generally Edwards, supra note 164; Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98
HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985) (judicial review of administrative agency's discretionary actions); Administrative Law During Deregulation-Recent Developments, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 105-231 (1986) (con-

cerning the changes in the roles and decisions of administrative agencies).
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duced would outweigh its costs.' 8

9

To the extent that the President's

judicial appointees agree with these views, their retreat from the techniques of institutional activism could reflect a new policy activism 90
which is unreceptive to environmental regulation or at least cost-inefficient regulation. 91 The accuracy of this hypothesis might be tested if a
judge committed to institutional restraint were asked to review an agency
decision that reflected a more favorable attitude toward environmental
regulation than his or her own. If institutional judicial activism, such as
a refusal to defer to the agency's resolution of legal or policy questions,
were to reemerge at that point, then one might suspect that the judge's
adherence to "institutional restraint" is in part attributable to policy ju192
dicial activism.
B.

The Retreat from InstitutionalActivism in a
Broader Regulatory Context

Realistically, it will be very difficult if not impossible to determine
whether judicial attitudes about the desirability of regulation have
changed, and whether those attitudes have contributed to the retreat
from institutional activism in environmental litigation. It is already
clear, however, that broader judicial philosophies about the proper role
of the courts in our system of government have evolved since the 1960's
and early 1970's. This evolution appears to be the principal cause of a
retreat from institutional activism throughout the federal judiciary in
cases involving all kinds of regulatory programs.
Of the three characteristics of institutional activism described above,
the tendency to expand the opportunities of statutory beneficiaries to participate in agency proceedings and to secure access to the courts has been
189. See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,036 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
127 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601, at 431-34 (1982). See generally Strauss & Sunstein, The Role
of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986).
190. Some judges concede that a change in judges' personal attitudes toward regulation in a
particular area could account for a change in their willingness to intervene in agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1833 (1978) ("I believe that, in practice, the reviewing standards courts apply
often reflect unarticulated assumptions about, or attitudes toward, the substantive aspects of the
subject matter being reviewed."); Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand
of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199, 224 ("I am not bothered overmuch by the undoubted
truth that a reviewing court is more likely to take a charitable view toward error in subsidiary
findings when it sympathizes with the agency's end result, than when it does not."). See also Kaufman, supra note 167, at 209.
191. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(deferring to EPA's view that it may consider cost and technological feasibility in deciding whether
to issue standards to control the emission of hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7412 (1982)).
192. See, e.g., supra note 178.
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most dramatically reversed. The Supreme Court has prohibited the
courts from imposing on the agencies procedures beyond those required
by due process or specified in the APA and applicable organic legislation. 193 In recent years, it has tightened rules governing the constitutional criteria for standing to sue, 194 made it much more difficult for the
courts to imply a private right of action to enforce regulatory statutes, 19 5
and created a presumption that an agency's discretionary decision not to
pursue statutory enforcement is unreviewable. 196 The Seventh Circuit,
among others, has followed the Court's lead, 97 especially in its reluctance to imply private statutory rights of action. The Seventh Circuit
recently noted that the federal courts once "generously conferred rights
of action on private litigants."'' 98 Since the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash, 199 however, "implied private rights of action have
been doled out parsimoniously.

' 20 0

According to the Seventh Circuit,

"there is now a strong presumption against the creation of private rights
193. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978). Cf Beerly v. Department of Treasury, 768 F.2d 942, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1184 (1986) (Due process did not require the use of "expensive and timeconsuming procedures" for oral testimony and cross-examination in Comptroller of the Currency's
appraisal of the interests of shareholders dissenting from national bank merger.); United Air Lines,
Inc. v. CAB, 766 F.2d 1107, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1985) (Agency resolving antitrust issue need not hold
evidentiary hearing with right to cross-examination.).
194. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975). But see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (environmental group and individuals living near nuclear power plant had standing to challenge constitutionality of the Price Anderson Act, which imposes limits on the liability of power plant operators in the
event of a "nuclear incident").
195. The Court's opinion in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which set forth a four-part test for
the implication of a private right of action, signalled a retreat from the Court's earlier willingness, in
cases such as J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), to imply such actions. The Court has since
restricted the availability of implied rights of action still further. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
287 (1981). See also R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 270-72.
196. See Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985). Recent decisions in various regulatory
contexts appear to indicate that the Seventh Circuit is reluctant to extend Heckler's "presumption of
unreviewability" beyond agency decisions not to enforce regulatory provisions. See, e.g., Cardoza v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1542, 1548-51 (7th Cir. 1985) (agency decision not
to review commodities exchange disciplinary action). See also North Am. Telecommunications
Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1985) (FCC order setting conditions for telephone operating
companies to market telephone equipment); Beerly v. Department of Treasury, 768 F.2d 942, 944-45
(7th Cir. 1985) (Comptroller of the Currency's appraisal of interests of shareholders dissenting from
bank merger).
197. See, e.g., Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 804 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1986) (applicant for hazardous waste management permit has no standing to challenge EPA remarks made
during permit denial proceedings).
198. Community & Economic Dev. Ass'n v. Suburban Cook County Area Agency on Aging,
770 F.2d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 1985).
199. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See supra note 195.
200. Community & Economic Dev. Ass'n, 770 F.2d at 664.
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of action by implication."' 20 1 In recent cases involving administrative
decisions denying a grant of federal funds for nutrition care services for
the elderly and refusing to overturn a commodities exchange disciplinary
determination, the Seventh Circuit applied that presumption in refusing
20 2
to imply a private right of action.
The Supreme Court has also led the way in the federal courts' reduced reliance on the remaining techniques of institutional activism,
although the courts' avoidance of these techniques has not been as consistent as their refusal to expand procedural opportunities for participation before the agency and in court. The Supreme Court, for example,
has engaged in narrow statutory interpretation 20 3 and has held, in the
face of statutory language that appeared to indicate the contrary, that
federal common law remedies were pre-empted by federal statute. 2°4 Finally, the high Court's inclination to defer to agency legal conclusions
has been pronounced, 20 5 although the Court has overturned the actions
of agencies whose explanations revealed the absence of any consideration
of relevant statutory factors. 20 6 Similarly, although the Seventh Circuit
occasionally refers to the "hard look" doctrine, 20 7 and provides relatively
little deference to the agencies when they change course without adequate explanation, 20 it typically goes out of its way to defer to agency
factual, 2° 9 policy, 210 and legal 2 11 conclusions.
201. Id. Indeed, the court was almost willing to concede "that the federal judiciary has simply
done away with implied rights of action sub silentio." Id.
202. See id.; Cardoza v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1542 (7th Cir. 1985).
203. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Occupational Safety and Health Administration may promulgate health and safety standards under
§ 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982), only upon a
showing of a significant risk of harm). This case is analyzed in Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to
OccupationalDisease: The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72 GEO. L.J. 1231, 1260
(1984). But see United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985) (Army Corps
of Engineers can apply Clean Water Act's dredge and fill permit requirements, 33 U.S.C. § 1344
(1982), to wetlands adjacent to navigable waters).
204. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). For a criticism of the Court's analysis in that case and a suggestion that the result is more consistent with policy judicial activism than
with an attempt to carry out legislative intent, see Glicksman, supra note 67, at 159-67.
205. See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116
(1985); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
206. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
207. See Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1986).
208. See Rosenthal & Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 802 F.2d 963, 969-74 (7th
Cir. 1986).
209. For a particularly broad statement of the scope of such deference, see Hospital Corp. of
Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1385 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Our only function is to determine whether the
[FTC's] analysis of the probable effects of these acquisitions on hospital competition in Chattanooga
is so implausible, so feebly supported by the record, that it flunks even the deferential test of substantial evidence.").
210. See Communication Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 1986) (discre-
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C. The Retreatfrom InstitutionalActivism and Separation of Powers
Concerns
The federal courts' recent withdrawal from the techniques of institutional activism appears to be attributable to both constitutional and practical concerns. Like the concerns that prompted the emergence of
institutional activism in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the concerns
responsible for the recent trend toward institutional restraint stem from
the separation of powers doctrine. Institutional activism in the earlier
environmental litigation was based on the belief that the courts played a
vital role in preventing the executive branch from overstepping the
bounds of its authority by checking the agencies' inclination to ignore
congressional commands. 212 More recently, the courts seem more concerned about judicial than executive branch infringement upon the authority of the other branches of government. 21 3 Judge Wallace of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has described the philosophy of
judicial restraint as rooted in the notion that the judge should "bear in
mind the value of deference to democratically elected officials and
lawmakers" and not substitute his "own moral and political values and
'2 14
sociological theories for those of our elected representatives.
Proponents of institutional judicial restraint agree with the institutional activists' contention that the legislative process is subverted when
a captured agency hands a particular group "a victory that was denied it
in the legislative arena through the efforts of another faction. ' 2 15 As
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit recently explained in an environmental case, a court's responsibility is to "enforce the [legislative] compromise, not the maximum position of one of the interest groups among
which the compromise was struck. ' 21 6 Thus, even judges exercising intion afforded NLRB to execute the National Labor Relations Act "is scarcely reviewable at all,
because the agency's decision is the implementation for which the law calls" (emphasis in original)).
211. See Rosenthal & Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 802 F.2d 963, 969 (7th Cir.
1986) (court deferred to agency's interpretation of § 2(a)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. § 4(a)(l) (1982)); Wisconsin v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 391, 397 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107
S. Ct. 926 (1987) (court should defer to agency's "reasonable and statutorily permissible" interpretations). But see Illinois v. HHS, 772 F.2d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating, without explaining why,
that it would not be appropriate to afford any deference to the agency's legal determinations).
212. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See also supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., OMC III, 773 F.2d at 890 (refusing to bestow upon EPA powers that Congress
withheld from the agency); OMC II, 680 F.2d at 478 (refusing to scrutinize the sufficiency of the
scheme Congress created for the control of water pollution).
214. Wallace, supra note 9, at 16. See also R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 207-08 (concept of
"structural" judicial restraint involves limiting the courts' power over the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government).
215. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303, 1309 (7th Cir. 1983).
216. Id. Some scholars describe the legitimate role of the courts in interpreting statutes quite
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stitutional restraint insist upon a statement of the reasons supporting an
agency's decisions. 21 7 Such judges are willing to reverse a decision accompanied by an explanation which reveals that, by ignoring a clear legislative determination, the agency changed the outcome of a legislative
battle.2 18 For similar reasons, agency decisions based upon ex parte con2 19
tacts by less than all of the affected interests are subject to reversal.
The proponents of institutional restraint, however, perceive a threat
to the legislative compromise not only in the captured agency, but also in
the activist court. They view each of the techniques of institutional activism as a potential threat to the efficacy of the compromise reached in the
legislative bargaining process (or to the legislative definition of the public
interest). An unduly expansive application of constitutional standing criteria, for example, leads to judicial evaluation of issues which the legislature has either already decided or concluded the executive branch should
resolve. 220 The implication of private rights of action not clearly authorized by statute permits members of interest groups whose enforcement
priorities differ from those of the agency to exercise a prosecutorial clout
not afforded them in the legislative process. 22 1 The expansion of statu-

tory coverage through broad statutory interpretation 222 or the creation of
differently. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 22, at 227 (judicial focus on interpretation of statutory
language, rather than on an attempt to discern and enforce the legislative compromise among special
interest groups, transforms statutes designed to benefit those groups into statutes that further "the
public interest").
217. E.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 638 F.2d 994, 1004 (7th Cir. 1980). For a comprehensive treatment of the derivations and functions of, and the justifications for, the reasons requirement,
see generally Shapiro & Levy, supra note 8.
218. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
219. See cases cited in Sunstein, supra note 22, at 62 n.148.
220. See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, § 5.4, at 141-42 (Injury in fact requirement responds well to the fear of the framers of the Constitution that "allowing the judiciary to decide legal
issues in the abstract inevitably would enmesh the courts in debates concerning the best policies to
pursue and the best methods to adopt those policies-matters the framers believed should be dealt
with exclusively by the legislative and executive branches of government.").
221. See Community & Economic Dev. Ass'n v. Suburban Cook County Area Agency on Aging, 770 F.2d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he judiciary may not extend the coverage of [regulatory
legislation] simply because it might disagree with the legislature's allocation of rights and remedies."). See also Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programsand Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195,
1207 (1982) ("[P]rivate rights of action may usurp the agency's responsibility for regulatory implementation, decrease legislative control over the nature and amount of enforcement activity, and force
courts to determine in the first instance the meaning of a regulatory statute."); id. at 1221 ("By
enlisting new enforcement resources, courts that create private remedies substantially affect the content of regulatory policy-a task properly reserved for the political branches."); R. POSNER, supra
note 3, at 271.
222. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1303, 1309 (7th Cir. 1986), where Judge
Posner stated that the court "would be upsetting the balance of power embodied in the legislation,
rather than merely completing the legislative scheme, if we allowed the EPA to act without a clearer
statutory authorization than we can find." See also Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton
League v. AEC, 533 F.2d 1011, 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976) (judicial protection
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federal common law remedies 223 provides the interest groups pressing the
courts for such expansion with substantive rights they were unable to
convince the legislature to create.
Finally, proponents of institutional restraint argue that a court's refusal to afford ample deference to an agency's statutory interpretation
and implementation may constitute illegitimate policy activism if it improperly intrudes upon legislative and executive branch prerogatives.
Challenges to agency decisions frequently involve unclear or ambiguous
statutory provisions which reflect a legislative unwillingness or inability
to agree on more specific language. In such a case, the legislature has
decided to leave to the agency the tasks of policy formulation and statutory interpretation. 224 A court that questions the consistency of the
agency's interpretation with the legislature's "intent" is therefore trying
to enforce a bargain that was never consummated, or at least a bargain
different from the one the legislature did strike (which was, in effect, an
agreement not to agree). The court thereby interferes with the agency's
attempt to accomplish its assigned task: the definition and enforcement
of the bargain Congress never reached. This kind of judicial interference
improperly nullifies the balance struck in the legislature in the same way
that a captured agency ignoring clear legislative commands would. Separation of powers concerns therefore dictate deference to the agency's
legal conclusions, so that the legislature's judgment that policy is best
225
formulated by the agency is left intact.
This constitutional justification for institutional restraint received its
most important endorsement in the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in the
Chevron case. 226 In deferring to EPA's application of the "bubble" concept 227 to nonattainment areas 228 under the Clean Air Act, the Court
of those opposed to the development of nuclear energy facilities would require assumption of
"broader judicial power in the matter than the law permits").
223. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981) ("Our 'commitment to the
separation of powers is too fundamental' to continue to rely on federal common law 'by judicially
decreeing what accords with "common sense and the public weal"' when Congress has addressed
the problem.") (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
224. See Communication Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 1986), which
discusses the delegation to the NLRB in § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act of the power to
issue "cease and desist" orders. The Act "leaves in the Board's charge the selection of any 'affirmative action' that will 'effectuate the policies of' the statute ....
This sort of discretion is scarcely
reviewable at all ....
" See also ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, § 7.1, at 352.
225. See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, § 7.4.3, at 375-76. It is not clear whether, and if
so when, Congress' commitment of policy judgments to an agency would itself violate the separation
of powers doctrine as an impermissible delegation of legislative authority.
226. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
227. The "bubble" concept permits the owner of a stationary source of air pollution to exceed
applicable emission limitations for that source, provided the excess is offset by reduced emissions
from another stationary source within the same plant. See id. at 840.
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stated:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile
competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences.... While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate
for this political branch of the Government to make . . . policy

choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the
agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the
agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a
gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case,
federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:
"Our Constitution
vests such responsibilities in the political
229
branches."

D.

The Retreat from InstitutionalActivism and Competence Concerns

Proponents of institutional restraint question more than the constitutional authority of the courts to employ the techniques of institutional
activism to prevent executive branch infringement upon legislative authority; they also doubt the courts' competence to ensure agency adherence to the legislative will. Judges refusing to interfere with agency
implementation of regulatory statutes often concede that they are unable
to match the agency's expertise concerning matters within its regulatory
jurisdiction. 2 30 Even if the courts are capable of understanding the issues
raised by agency decisions, proponents of institutional restraint question
228. A nonattainment area is one which has not met the statutory deadline for achieving the
national ambient air quality standards for a so-called criteria air pollutant. See 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2)
(1982).
229. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 865-66 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
It is interesting that none of the Supreme Court Justices who would have invalidated recent delegations of policy-making authority under the non-delegation doctrine objected on that ground to the
Clean Air Act's delegation to EPA in the "bubble case." See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
230. See, e.g., River Rd. Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 764 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007,
1019 (7th Cir. 1984). Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit advanced this position well:
"If, as Socrates said, it is a wise man who knows what he does not know, a discussion of 'coping with
technology through the legal process' should allow me to display uncommon wisdom-because technology, and science, are things about which I frankly know very little." Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 817 (1977). See also Kaufman, supra
note 167, at 201. Academic commentators have urged judicial restraint for the same reason. See,
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the efficacy of the activist techniques. A court convinced that the agency
has subverted the legislature's will can only remand the matter to the
agency; it cannot make the ultimate regulatory decision. There is no
guarantee that the agency will rethink the issues or even try to come any
closer to implementing its statutory mandate the second time around. It
may only dress up the same substantive decision with an explanation
more likely to satisfy the reviewing court. 231 Accordingly, some judges
have begun to conclude that the costs of employing the techniques of
institutional activism (primarily delay) do not justify the benefits those
techniques produce (a slight, if any, improvement in the quality of
2 32
agency decision-making).
The ranks of the advocates of institutional restraint may be growing
due to the mounting caseloads and backlogs in federal court dockets.
Justice Scalia and Judge Posner, among others, contend that heavier
2 33
caseloads may impair the federal courts' ability to function effectively.
The delay caused by docket overload, for example, may cause the deterioration of evidence, require courts to decide which cases to expedite and
which to put on the back burner, and reduce the time available to study
the record and explore the implications of agency decisions subject to
review. 234 Perhaps for these reasons, "the premise of judicial restraint,"
according to Judge Wallace, is "that courts are hearing too wide a range
of cases."'2 35 Advocates of institutional restraint agree that judicial concern over the effects of docket overload has curtailed courts' willingness
to resort to all three of the major varieties of the techniques of institutional activism. This concern probably has contributed to the narrowing
e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, § 5.1.4, at 125, § 7. 1, at 35 1; Verkuil, Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REv. 418, 427 (1981).
231. See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, § 7.1, at 351-52; Diver, supra note 19, at 428-29.
As long ago as 1973, Professor Sax criticized NEPA on this basis: "I cannot imagine a more dubious example of wishful thinking. I know of no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring
articulation, detailed findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of the administrative decisions." Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 239 (1973).
Cf. Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633, 643 (7th Cir. 1986) (court's remand to comply with
NEPA is not "merely to require a longer record and more paper").
232. See, e.g., River Rd. Alliance, 764 F.2d at 451 (7th Cir. 1985) (questioning the wisdom of
requiring agencies to prepare routinely environmental impact statements under NEPA); ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 7, § 6.1.4, at 126. Cf. Wallace, supra note 9, at 7 (courts "become costineffective when asked to re-engineer social structures and reorganize social priorities").
233. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 1; R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 208.
234. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of
Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 554-55 (1968). See generally R. POSNER,
supra note 3.
235. Wallace, supra note 9, at 11. See also R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 207 (the decisions of a
self-restrained judge "are influenced by a concern lest promiscuous judicial creation of rights result
in so swamping the courts in litigation that they cannot function effectively").
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of standing criteria, 236 the reluctance to create substantive rights through
expansive statutory interpretation or the application of federal common
law, 23 7 and the increased deference afforded to agency legal
238
conclusions.
E.

Summary

The Seventh Circuit's retreat from institutional judicial activism to
promote the implementation of environmental legislation appears to be
part of a broader trend prompted by a shift in prevailing judicial philosophy in the Seventh Circuit as well as throughout the federal judiciary: to
an increasing extent, the federal courts appear to be convinced that institutional activism requires judicial resolution of issues beyond the courts'
competence and masks a policy activism which improperly invades the
law and policy-making domain of the legislative and executive branches.
The recent movement toward institutional restraint, then, has been motivated by separation of powers concerns and by the conviction that institutional activism has not worked in the past to confine agency discretion
within statutory boundaries and is even less likely to do so in the future
due to the increasing caseloads of the federal courts.
V.

CONCLUSION

It would be premature to try to predict whether the retreat from
institutional activism, either generally or in environmental cases, is a permanent phenomenon. But the techniques of institutional activism and
restraint are manipulable doctrines. Since both judicial philosophies are
premised upon legitimate separation of powers concerns, it would not be
surprising to see the pendulum continue to swing back and forth between
institutional activism and restraint in the context of judicial review of the
implementation of regulatory statutes.
It is appropriate during a period when institutional restraint is apparently ascendant to note the potential for the exercise of such restraint
to raise separation of powers concerns. Institutional activism represents
an attempt to prevent executive branch interference with legislative pow236. See R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 208-09. Cf. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986) (mounting federal
caseloads justify assessing a defendant's attorney's fees against plaintiffs filing groundless litigation).
See also Floralife, Inc. v. Floraline Int'l, Inc., 807 F.2d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
237. See R. POSNER, supra note 3, at 207-08.
238. See Carrington, supra note 234, at 554. Cf. Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1177 (7th
Cir. 1985) (desire to lighten judicial caseload justifies creation of a presumption in favor of approving
settlement between Department of Labor and trustee of employer benefit fund administered pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)).
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ers. Institutional restraint focuses on the potential for separation of powers violations if an overzealous judiciary engaged in policy activism
usurps legislative or executive authority. Institutional restraint, however, may also facilitate an invasion of the legislature's domain by both
the courts and the agencies.
Institutional restraint is motivated in large part by the courts' desire
to avoid exercising authority that the Constitution vests in the other two
branches of government. This fear of judicial overreaching has
prompted, for example, frequent resort to the doctrine of deference to
administrative expertise. Typically, when Congress feels the need for
assistance in carrying out its law-making responsibilities it calls on the
executive branch by delegating to the president or to administrative agencies the authority to implement a regulatory program. Recent opinions
like the Supreme Court's decision in the "bubble case" 239 reflect the notion that failure to defer to the views of the recipient of the delegated
powers would interfere improperly with this allocation of policy-making
responsibility between the political branches.
When Congress turns to the agencies to flesh out a regulatory program, however, it does not thereby abdicate its policy-making function.
The legislature has several means of confining agency discretion, including the delegation to the federal courts of the power to review agency
decisions for consistency with legislative aims. If the courts do not take
their delegated responsibilities seriously-if they stop insisting upon a
statement of reasons for agency action and fail to reverse when those
reasons cannot be reconciled with the discernible goals of the statutethen the prospects for executive branch indifference to or defiance of legislative commands will increase. 240 If judicial deference to agency reasoning becomes little more than judicial rubber-stamping of agency
239. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
This case is discussed at supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
240. Judge Skelly Wright, dissenting in a recent Clean Air Act case involving EPA's regulation
of hazardous air pollutants, commented on this danger in protesting against what he perceived to be
unwarranted deference to EPA's interpretation of the Act:
The majority effectively suggests that judicial deference to administrative agencies is due
whenever any ambiguity can be found in the legislative history of a provision, regardless of
ambiguity or lack thereof in the actual language and structure of the statute. This approach comes perilously close to establishing an absolute rule of judicial deference to
agency interpretations .... The majority would impose upon Congress a duty to be clear
that goes far beyond what that body, or any human drafter, could possibly hope to achieve
on a consistent basis in an age of complex statutory schemes. In our caution not to rob the
Executive Branch of its proper role in the constitutional system, we must be extremely
careful not to deprive Congress of effective legislative control over agency action.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wright, J.,
dissenting). For an argument that the separation of powers doctrine compels the agencies to provide
an adequate statement of reasons for their actions, see Shapiro & Levy, supra note 8.
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decisions, a significant check on agency discretion will have become ineffectual. Institutional restraint carried to such extremes would thus have
significant implications for legislative behavior. Congress would either
have to resign itself to relatively unconfined agency delegations or turn to
other mechanisms to protect its policy-making turf from infringement by
the agencies. At least in the environmental area, Congress has already
recognized this need for self-protection and has begun taking steps, such
as more specific delegations and the imposition of deadlines for agency
actions, to restrict EPA's discretion. 24 ' It is too soon to tell how effective
these new mechanisms for confining agency discretion will be compared
to reliance on the techniques of institutional judicial activism.
The federal courts' failure to implement conscientiously the tasks
assigned to them in regulatory legislation also threatens judicial usurpation of legislative authority. All of the modem environmental statutes
recognize the need for judicial assistance to achieve legislative goals.
These laws authorize private access to the courts to review agency decisions 242 and to enforce statutory violations. 243 Narrow interpretations of
statutory or constitutional standing criteria may limit this access. The
environmental statutes also expressly preserve the rights of private persons to resort to judicial enforcement of other legal constraints on polluting activities, such as common law tort remedies. 244 The courts, through
some rather tortured statutory construction, in recent years have eliminated many of these supplemental rights and remedies. 245 The impetus
for such reductions in the judicial role in achieving the goals of environmental statutes is surely in most instances a legitimate attempt to implement Congress' intent. It is possible, however, that these or similar
examples of institutional restraint have been or could be motivated by the
judges' doubts about their own competence to carry out congressionally
assigned tasks or their desire to avoid burdening the courts with respon241. See generally the 1984 amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub.
L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 5576 (1984); the 1986 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L.
No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 642 (1986); and the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986).
242. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1982).
243. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(1982).
244. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(e) (1982).
245. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 328-29 (1981) (holding that, despite a
savings clause preserving "any right which any person ... may have under.., common law," the
1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act pre-empted the federal common law of nuisance); Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985) (concluding
that the 1972 amendments also preempted state common law remedies in interstate pollution disputes). See generally Glicksman, supra note 67 (criticizing these two decisions).
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sibilities which they feel are better executed elsewhere. If so, the courts
would be improperly second-guessing the legislature by upsetting its determination that the courts are better equipped than Congress or the
agencies to perform the particular task in question. Thus, a decision purporting to rest on considerations of institutional restraint, like a decision
premised on institutional activism, may in fact be a vehicle for policy
judicial activism.
Although both institutional activism and restraint are meant to address separation of powers concerns, they may create such concerns if
not exercised honestly and carefully. A balanced resort to the techniques
of institutional activism and restraint is necessary. In its recent administrative law opinions, the Supreme Court appears to be seeking the best
way to achieve that balance. The Court has announced a broad rule of
judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, 246 for
example, but has reversed agency decisions which cannot be reconciled
with governing statutory authority. 247 The federal appellate courts have
the opportunity to assist the Court in defining the constitutionally appropriate mix of institutional activism and restraint. They should embark
upon this task by carefully measuring the potential for the application of
the techniques of both institutional activism and restraint to a particular
regulatory program to facilitate or check improper infringement on legislative or executive authority. Above all, they should avoid disguising
judicial policy activism as legitimate attempts to check potential violations of the separation of powers doctrine through the techniques of institutional activism or restraint.

246. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.

